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Abstract 
The productivity of firms is, at least partly, determined by a firm's actions and decisions. One of these 
decisions involves the organization of production in terms of the number of layers of management the 
firm decides to employ. Using detailed employer-employee matched data and firm production quantity 
and input data for Portuguese firms, we study the endogenous response of revenue-based and quantity-
based productivity to a change in layers: a firm reorganization. We show that as a result of an 
exogenous demand or productivity shock that makes the firm reorganize and add a management layer, 
quantity based productivity increases by about 4%, while revenue-based productivity drops by more 
than 4%. Such a reorganization makes the firm more productive, but also increases the quantity 
produced to an extent that lowers the price charged by the firm and, as a result, its revenue-based 
productivity. 
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 L. Caliendo, G. Mion, L.D. Opromolla, and E. Rossi-Hansberg, submitted 2015. 
uctuations in rm productivity. However, these random and perhaps exogenousproductivity or demand
uctuations, result in rm reactions that change the way production is organized, thereby a¤ecting its
measured productivity. For example, a sudden increase in demand due to a product becoming fashionable
can lead a rm to expand and add either a plant, a more complex management structure, a new division, or
a new building or structure to its production facilities. Many of these investments are lumpy and, as such,
will change the production e¢ ciency of the rm discontinuously.
In this paper we study the changes in productivity observed in Portuguese rms when they reorganize
their management structure by adding or dropping layers of management. Consider a rm that wants to
expand as a result of a positive demand shock and decides to add a layer of management (say add another
division with a CEO that manages the whole rm). The new organization is suitable for a larger rm and
lowers the average cost of the rm thereby increasing its quantity-based productivity. Moreover, the switch
to an organizational structure tted for a larger rm also reduces the marginal cost of the rm leading to
higher quantities and lower prices. That is, at the moment of the switch, the rm is using a technology that
is still a bit big for the size of its market, which reduces revenue-based productivity. The reason for this
is that the organizational decision is lumpy. So a change in organization that adds organizational capacity
in the form of a new management layer, leads to increases in quantity-based productivity, but reductions
in revenue-based productivity through reductions in prices (due to reduction in the marginal cost, and,
perhaps also due to reductions in mark-ups). In that sense, the endogenous response of rm productivity
to exogenous shocks can be complex and di¤er depending on the measure of productivity used. Using a
recently developed measure of changes in organization we show that these patterns are very much present
in the Portuguese data.
Although the logic above applies to many types of organizational changes and other lumpy investments,
we explain it in more detail using a knowledge-based hierarchy model that can guide us in our empirical
implementation. Furthermore, this model provides an easy way to identify the changes in organization as
we explain below. The theory of knowledge-based hierarchies was developed in Rosen (1982), Garicano
(2000) and in an equilibrium context with heterogeneous rms in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012, from now on CRH). In particular, we use the model in CRH since
it provides an application of this theory to an economy with rms that face heterogeneous demands for
their products. In that paper the authors characterize the pattern of quantity-based and revenue-based
productivity as rms reorganize as a result of an exogenous demand or productivity shock.
The basic technology is one that requires time and knowledge. Workers use their time to produce
and generate problemsor production possibilities. Output requires solving this problems. Workers have
knowledge that they use to try to solve these problems. If they know how to solve them, they do, and
output is realized. Otherwise they can redirect the problem to a manager one layer above. Such a manager
tries to solve the problem and, if it cannot, can redirect the problem to an even higher-level manager. The
organizational problem of the rm is to determine, how much does each employee know, how many of them
to employ, and how many layers of management to use in production.
2
1 Introduction
A rms productivity depends on the way it organizes production. The decisions of its owners and managers
on how to combine inputs and factors of di¤erent types with particular technologies, as well as size, marketing
and pricing strategies all determine the production e¢ ciency of a rm. Clearly, decision makers in a rm
face many constraints and random shocks. Random innovations or disruptions, regulatory uncertainties,
changes in tastes and fads, among many other idiosyncratic shocks, are undoubtedly partly responsible for
Using matched employer-employee data for the French manufacturing sector, Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-
Hansberg (2015, from now on CMRH) show how to use occupation data to identify the layers of management
in a rm.1 They show that the theory of knowledge-based hierarchies can rationalize the layer-level changes
in the number of employees and wages as rms grow either with or without changing layers. For example,
as implied by the theory, a reorganization that adds a layer of management leads to increases in the number
of hours employed in each layer but to a reduction in the average wage in each preexisting layer. In
contrast, when rms grow without reorganizing they add hours of work to each layer and they increase
the wages of each worker. This evidence shows that when rms expand and contract they actively manage
their organization by hiring workers with di¤erent characteristics. The Portuguese data exhibits the same
patterns that CMRH found for France. Importantly, the detailed input, price and quantity data for Portugal
allows us to go a step further and measure the productivity implications of changes in organization.
Measuring productivity well is notoriously complicated and the industrial organization literature has
proposed a variety of techniques to do so (see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Wooldridge (2009), and De Loecker and Warzinsky (2012), among others).
The rst issue is whether we want to measure quantity or revenue-based productivity. The distinction is
crucial since the rst measures how e¤ective is a rm in transforming inputs and factors into output, while
the other also measure any price variation, perhaps related to markups, that result from market power. The
ability of rms to determine prices due to some level of market power is a reality that is hard to abstract
from. Particularly when considering changes in scale that make rms move along their demand curve and
change their desired prices. We nd that using a host of di¤erent measures of revenue productivity (from
value-added per worker to Olley and Pakes, 1996, and Wooldridge, 2009), adding layers is related to decreases
in revenue-based productivity. As explained above, our theory suggests that this should be the case since
rms reduce prices when they expand. However, since rms also received a variety of idiosyncratic demand,
markup, and productivity shocks every period it is hard to just directly look at prices to measure this e¤ect.
To measure the e¤ect of organizational change on quantity-based productivity we need a methodology
that can account for demand, markup, and productivity shocks over time and across rms.2 We use the
methodology proposed by Forlani et al., (2014), which from now on we refer to as MULAMA. This method
makes some relatively strong assumptions on the structure of the production function, as well as rm
maximization and competition (Cobb-Douglas and monopolistic competition with some generalizations), but
it allows for correlated demand and productivity disturbances. Furthermore, it is amenable to introducing
the organizational structure we described above. Note also that since we focus on changes in quantity-based
productivity as a result of a rm reorganization we can sidestep the di¢ culties in comparing quantity-
based productivity across horizontally di¤erentiated products. Using this methodology, and quantity data
available in the Portuguese data, we nd that quantity-based productivity is an increasing function of the
1Following CMRH several studies have shown that occupational categories identify layers of management in other datasets.
For example, Tåg (2013) for the Swedish data and Friedrich (2015) for the Danish data.
2See Marschak and Andrews (1944) and Klette and Griliches (1996) for a discussion of the output price bias when calculating
productivity.
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quantity produced. However, quantity-based productivity increases signicantly only when rms grow by
adding layers. Furthermore, when we introduce layers directly in the measurement of rm productivity,
adding layers is associated with increases in quantity-based productivity. The nding survives a variety
of robustness checks and alternative formulations of the productivity process. For example, we can allow
for changes in organization to have a permanent or only a contemporaneous impact on quantity-based
productivity. This is our main nding: we link a careful measure of productive e¢ ciency (quantity-based
productivity as measured by MULAMA) with an increase in the management capacity of a rm (as measured
by the number of layers)3.
Up to this point we have not addressed the issue of causality. The results above only state that adding
layers coincides with declines in revenue-based productivity and increases in quantity-based productiv-
ity. Our theory suggests that the relationship is causal, and the fact that it explains the pattern of both
revenue-based and quantity-based productivity seems to support this interpretation. So we set out to use
instrumental variables to verify this implication empirically. Our methodology suggests a variety of past rm
decisions (like capital, past employment, etc.) as valid instrumental variables when organizational change
a¤ects productivity only contemporaneously. We show that our results on quantity-based productivity in
fact seem to be causal. Our ndings with instrumental variables are in general signicant, although the
estimation is somewhat more noisy, which prevents us from using as rich a set of xed e¤ects as the one we
used in all the other regression results.
In sum, in this paper we show that the organizational structure of rms, as measured by their hierarchical
occupational composition, has direct implications on the productivity of rms. As they add organizational
layers, their quantity-based productivity increases, although the corresponding expansion decreases their
revenue productivity as they reduce prices. This endogenous component of productivity determines, in
part, the observed heterogeneity in both revenue and quantity-based productivity across rms. Failure to
reorganize in order to grow can, therefore, result in an inability to exploit available productivity improve-
ments. This would imply that rms remain ine¢ ciently small, as has been documented in some developing
countries (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a short recap of the knowledge-
hierarchy theory that we use to guide our empirical exploration and describe its implications for productivity.
Section 3 discusses the Portuguese manufacturing data set we use in the paper. Section 4 presents the
basic characteristics of Portuguese production hierarchies. In particular, we show that rms with di¤erent
numbers of layers are in fact di¤erent and that changes in the number of layers are associated with the
expected changes in the number of workers and wages at each layer. Section 5 presents our main results on
revenue-based productivity, as well as the methodology we use to measure quantity-based productivity and
our main empirical results on this measure. It also presents a variety of robustness results as well as our
results for quantity-based productivity using instrumental variables. Section 6 concludes. The appendix
3 In a related result, Garcia and Voigtländer (2014) nd among new Chilean exporters a reduction in revenue-based pro-
ductivity and an increase in quantity-based productivity. The mechanism and ndings in our paper can be used directly to
rationalize their ndings since exporting amounts to a rm revenue shock.
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includes more details on our data set, a description of all tables and gures, as well as additional derivations
and robustness tests of the results in the main text.
2 A Sketch of a Theory of Organization and its Empirical Implications
The theory of knowledge-based hierarchies, initially proposed by Garicano (2000), has been developed using
a variety of alternative assumptions (see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015, for a review). Here we discuss
the version of the technology with homogenous agents and heterogeneous demand developed in CRH.
So consider rm i in period t that faces a Cobb-Douglas technology
Qit (Oit;Mit;Kit) = aitO
O
it M
M
it K
 M H
it (1)
with quantity-based productivity ait; returns to scale given by  and where Oit denotes the labor input,
Mit material inputs and Kit capital. The parameter O  0 represents the expenditure share on the labor
input, M  0 on materials and    M   O on physical capital. The labor input is produced using the
output of a variety of di¤erent workers with particular levels of knowledge. The organizational problem is
embedded in this input. That is, we interpret the output of the knowledge hierarchy as generating the labor
input of the rm. Hence, in the rest of this section we focus on the organizational problem of labor and
abstract from capital and materials. We return to the other factors in our estimation of productivity below.
Production of the labor input requires time and knowledge. Agents employed as workers specialize
in production, use their unit of time working in the production oor and use their knowledge to deal
with any problems they face in production. Each unit of time generates a problem, that, if solved yields
one unit of output. Agents employed as managers specialize in problem solving, use h units of time to
familiarize themselves with each problem brought by a subordinate, and solve the problems using their
available knowledge. Problems are drawn from a distribution F (z) with F 00 (z) < 0: Workers in a rm
know how to solve problems in an interval of knowledge [0; z0L]; where the superindex 0 denotes the layer
(0 for workers) and the subindex the total number of management layers in the rm, L. Problems outside
this interval, are passed on to managers of layer 1. Hence, if there are n0L workers in the rm, n
1
L =
hn0L
 
1  F  z0L, managers of layer one are needed. In general, managers in layer ` learn hZ` 1L ; Z`Li and
there are n`L = hn
0
L(1 F (Z` 1L )) of them, where Z`L =
P`
l=0 z
l
L: Problems that are not solved by anyone in
the rm are discarded. Agents with knowledge z`L obtain a wage w
 
z`L

where w0
 
z`L

> 0 and w00
 
z`L
  0.
Market wages simply compensate agents for their cost of acquiring knowledge.
The organizational problem of the rm is to choose the number of workers in each layer, their knowledge
and therefore their wages, and the number of layers. Hence, consider a rm that produces a quantity O of
the labor input. CL (O;w) is the minimum cost of producing a labor input O with an organization with L
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layers4 at a prevailing wage schedule w (), namely,
CL (O;w) = min
fn`L;z`LgLl=00
XL
`=0
n`Lw

z`L

(2)
subject to
O  F (ZLL )n0L; (3)
n`L = hn
0
L[1  F (Z` 1L )] for L  ` > 0; (4)
nLL = 1: (5)
The rst constraint just states that total production of the labor input should be larger or equal than
O; the second is the time constraint explained above, and the third states that all rms need to be headed
by one CEO. The last constraint is important since it implies that small rms cannot have a small fraction
of the complex organization of a large rm. We discuss bellow the implications of partially relaxing this
constraint. The variable cost function is given by
C (O;w) = min
L0
fCL (O;w)g :
CRH show that the average cost function (AC (O;w) = C (O;w) =O) that results from this problem exhibits
the properties depicted in Figure 1 (which we reproduce from CMRH). Namely, it is U-shaped given the
number of layers, with the average cost associated to the minimum e¢ cient scale that declines as the rm
adds layers. Each point in the average cost curve in the gure correspond to a particular organizational
design. Note that the average cost curve faced by the rm is the lower-envelope of the average cost curves for a
given number of layers. The crossings of these curves determine a set of output thresholds (or correspondingly
demand thresholds5) at which the rms decides to reorganize by changing the number of layers. The overall
average cost, including materials and capital, of a rm that is an input price taker will have exactly the
same shape (given our specication of the production function in equation (1) under  = 1).
Consider the three dots in the gure, which correspond to rms that face di¤erent levels of demand
as parametrized by .6 Suppose that after solving the corresponding prot maximization using the cost
function above, a rm that faces a demand level of  decides to produce Q () (or q () in logs). The top
panel on the right-hand-side of Figure 1 tells us that it will have one layer with 5 workers and one layer
with one manager above them. The gure also indicates the wages of each of them (the height of each bar),
4Throughout we refer to the number of layers of the rm by the number of management layers. So rms with only workers
have zero layers, rms with workers and managers have 1 layer, etc.
5Note that since output increases (decreases) discontinuously when the rm adds (drops) layers, the average cost curve is
discontinuous as a function of the level of demand :
6 In our examples here we focus on changes in the level of demand. Later on we will further consider changes in the exogenous
component of productivity and changes in markups. Indeed, whatever pushes the rm to change its desired output can a¤ect
a rms organizational structure.
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which is increasing in their knowledge. Now consider a rm that as a result of a demand shock expands to
Q
 
0

without reorganizing, that is, keeping the same number of layers. The rm expands the number of
workers and it increases their knowledge and wages. The reason is that the one manager needs to hire more
knowledgeable workers, who ask less often, in order to increase her span of control. In contrast, consider
a rm that expands to Q
 
00

: This rm reorganizes by adding a layer. It also hires more workers at all
preexisting layers. However, it hires less knowledgeable workers, at lower wages, in all preexisting layers.
The reason is that by adding a new layer the rm can avoid paying multiple times for knowledge that is
rarely used by the bottom ranks in the hierarchy. In the next section we show that all these predictions are
conrmed by the data.
Figure 1: Average Cost and Organization
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We can also use Figure 1 to show how the organizational structure changes as we relax the integer
constraint of the top manager, in (5). First, note that at the minimum e¢ cient scale (MES), which is given
by the minimum of the average cost, having one manager at the top is optimal for the rm. So the constraint
in (5) is not binding. Hence, relaxing the constraint can a¤ect the shape of the average cost function on
segments to the right and to the left of the MES. The reason why average costs rise for quantities other
than MES is that rms are restricted to have one manager at the top. Otherwise, the rm could expand
the optimal organizational structure at the MES by just replicating the hierarchy proportionally as it adds
or reduces managers at the top.
For instance, suppose we allow organizations to have more than one manager at the top, namely nLL  1:
Figure 1 presents dashed lines that depict the shape of the average cost for this case. As we can see, the
average cost is at for segments to the right of the MES up to the point in which the rm decides to add a
new layer. At the moment of the switch, the average cost starts falling until it reaches the MES and then it
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becomes at again. All the predictions that we discussed before still hold for this case. The only di¤erence
is the way in which rms expand after they reach their MES up to the point in which they reorganize. We
allow for this extra degree of exibility when we use the structure of the model and take it to the data.7
2.1 Productivity Implications
In the following section we show that rms that grow or shrink substantially do so by adding or dropping
management layers. These reorganizations also have consequences on the measured productivity of rms.
In the model above quantity-based productivity of a rm in producing the labor input can be measured
as the inverse of the average cost at constant factor prices; namely, Q () = C (Q () ;C (; 1) ; 1; 1) where
C (Q () ;C (;w) ; Pm; r) denotes the overall cost function of the rm and Pm and r the price of materials
and capital. Note that Q () denotes quantity produced and not revenue. Revenue-based productivity is
instead given by P ()Q () = C (Q () ;C (; 1) ; 1; 1) where P () denotes the rms output price.8
For most demand systems, under monopolistic competition, the price P () will respond to changes in
the marginal cost. If the demand system is CES, the change is proportional. CRH show that the marginal
cost falls discontinuously when rms adds layers and increases discontinuously when rms drop them. The
reason is that by adding layers the rm switches to a technology that is suited for a larger scale of production.
That is, a rm can add layers even if demand does not increase enough to make it produce at the minimum
e¢ cient scale of the new technology. Hence, the marginal cost of producing a unit of output is lower than
at the minimum e¢ cient scale, and we know that the minimum e¢ cient scale of the rm increases with the
number of layers (and, at that point, the average and marginal costs are identical).
Quantity-based productivity increases with an increase in  when the rm adds layers. The reason is
that any voluntary increase in layers results in a level of produced quantity that lowers the average costs of
the rm. Still, under CES preferences, CRH show that the resulting e¤ect on prices dominates the positive
quantity-based productivity e¤ect and results in a discontinuous decrease in revenue-based productivity.9
This e¤ect in both types of productivity is illustrated in Figure 2 where we consider the e¤ect of a shock in
 that leads to a reorganization that adds one layer of management.
In sum, rms that add layers as a result of a marginal revenue shock increase their quantity discontinu-
ously. The new organization is more productive at the new scale, resulting in an increase in quantity-based
7Alternatively, one could also relax the integer constraint by letting nLL  ; where 1 >  > 0. Following the discussion in the
main body, in this case, the average cost also has at segments to the left of the MES up to the point in which it reaches nLL = :
At this point the average cost jumps to the level of the MES of the new optimal (and lower) number of layers. Depending
on the value of  this will imply that the rm might decide to drop more than one layer. If  is low enough, the average cost
curve will be a step function with no smoothing declining segments. The lower is ; the easier it is for the rm to produce less
quantity with more layers, and in the limit, as  ! 0; rms converge to L = 1: This case is counterfactual since we observe
that in most cases rms expand by adding one layer at the time (see Section 4).
8Of course, once we reintroduce materials and capital, changes in O are changes in total production Q instead, and the cost
is the total average cost of the rm. However, the implications for revenue-based and quantity-based productivity are the same
under our Cobb-Douglas production function specication.
9CRH show this result where markups are constant. More generally, the result holds for preferences such that the e¤ect on
prices is dominated by changes in marginal costs rather than by changes in markups.
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productivity, but the quantity expansion decreases price and revenue-based productivity. When rms face
negative shocks that make them drop layers we expect the opposite e¤ects.
Figure 2: Quantity and Revenue Productivity Changes as a Firm Adds Layers
Demand shifter
Quantity-based Productivity
Jump
Demand shifter
Revenue-based Productivity
Jump
2.1.1 An example
To illustrate the mechanism described above we can use the example of a single-product rm producing
aluminium cookware (anonymous given condentiality requirements). It increased its workforce over time
and, in particular, by 27 percent between 1996 and 1998. In the same period exports increased by 170%,
and went from representing 10% of the rms sales in 1996 to 16% in 1998. Between 1997 and 1998 the rm
reorganized and added a layer of management.
Our rm had a layer of workers and a layer of managers until 1997 and it added a new layer of man-
agement in 1998 (so it went from 1 layer to 2 layers of management). Figure 3 plots its quantity-based
and revenue-based productivity around the reorganization (we plot 3 alternative measures of revenue-based
productivity).10 The pattern in the gure is typical in our data. The year in which the rm reorganizes its
quantity-based productivity clearly jumps up and its revenue-based productivity declines. In contrast, it is
hard to see any signicant pattern in the changes in these measures of productivity for the year before or
the year after adding the extra layer.
Figure 4 shows the corresponding levels of output, prices and revenue for the same rm and time period.
The graph shows how, in fact, the increase in quantity-based productivity is accompanied by an increase
in quantity, a fairly large decrease in price, and a small increase in revenue. These changes align exactly
with our story in which the increase in quantity-based productivity generated by the reorganization (that
adds a layer of management) leads to an increase in quantity, a lower marginal cost that leads to a decline
in price, and a correspondingly muted increase in revenue and decline in revenue-based productivity. Note
10We describe the precise methodology and data used to measure both types of productivity in detail in Section 4.
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that quantity in this rms grows not only at the time of the reorganization but before and after it as well.
This is consistent with a rm that is progressively moving toward the quantity threshold in which it decides
to reorganize. In these other years, demand and productivity shocks do not trigger a reorganization and so
we do not see the corresponding decline in price.
Figure 3: An Example of a Firm that Adds Layers: Productivity Measures (logs)
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Of course, the case of this rm could be an isolated event in which all these variables happen to align in a
way consistent with our interpretation. The rest of the paper is dedicated to present systematic evidence of
the ubiquitousness of these exact patterns for quantity and revenue-based productivity as rms reorganize.
3 Data Description and Processing
Our data set is built from three data sources: a matched employer-employee panel data set, a rm-level
balance sheet data set, and a rm-product-level data set containing information on the production of manu-
factured goods. Our data covers the manufacturing sector of continental Portugal for the years 1995-2005.11
As explained below in detail, the matched employer-employee data virtually covers the universe of rms,
while both the balance sheet data set and the production data set only cover a sample of rms. We build
11 Information for the year 2001 for the matched employer-employee dataset was not collected. Hence, our sample excludes
the year 2001 (see Appendix A).
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Figure 4: An Example of a Firm that Adds Layers: Output, Price, and Revenue
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two nested samples. The largest of them sources information from the matched employer-employee data
set for the subset of rms for which we also have balance sheet data. We refer to this sample as Sample 1.
It contains enough information to calculate measures of revenue-based productivity at the rm-year-level.
The second sample covers a further subset of rms for which we also have production data. This data is
necessary to calculate quantity-based productivity at the rm-product-year-level. We refer to this sample as
Sample 2. All our revenue-based productivity results below hold similarly well for both samples, although
we present mostly results using Sample 2 in order to make results more easily comparable.
Employer-employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth, QP), a data set made available by
the Ministry of Employment of Portugal, drawing on a compulsory annual census of all rms in Portugal
that employ at least one worker.12 Currently, the data set collects data on about 350,000 rms and 3 million
employees. Reported data cover the rm itself, each of its plants, and each of its workers. Each rm and each
worker entering the database are assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number which we use to follow
rms and workers over time. Variables available in the data set include the rms location, industry, total
12Public administration and non-market services are excluded. Quadros de Pessoal has been used by, amongst others,
Blanchard and Portugal (2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets in terms of unemployment duration and
worker ows; by Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution of the rm size distribution; by Mion and Opromolla (2014)
to show that the export experience acquired by managers in previous rms leads their current rm towards higher export
performance, and commands a sizeable wage premium for the manager.
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employment, and sales. The worker-level data cover information on all personnel working for the reporting
rms in a reference week in October of each year. They include information on occupation, earnings, and
hours worked (normal and overtime). The information on earnings includes the base wage (gross pay for
normal hours of work), seniority-indexed components of pay, other regularly paid components, overtime
work, and irregularly paid components. It does not include employerscontributions to social security.13
The second data set is Central de Balanços (henceforth, CB), a repository of yearly balance sheet data
for non nancial rms in Portugal. Prior to 2005 the sample was biased towards large rms. However, the
value added and sales coverage rate was high. For instance, in 2003 rms in the CB data set accounted for
88.8 percent of the national accounts total of non-nancial rmssales. Information available in the data
set includes a rm sales, material assets, costs of materials, and third-party supplies and services.
The third data set is the Inquérito Anual à Produção Industrial (henceforth, PC), a data set made
available by Statistics Portugal (INE), containing information on sales and volume sold for each rm-
product pair for a sample of rms with at least 20 employees covering at least 90 percent of the value of
aggregate production. From PC we use information on the volume and value of a rms production. The
volume is recorded in units of measurement (number of items, kilograms, liters) that are product-specic
while the value is recorded in current euros. From the raw data it is possible to construct di¤erent measures
of the volume and value of a rms production. For the sake of this project we use the volume and value
corresponding to a rms sales of its products. This means that we exclude products produced internally and
to be used in other production processes within the rm as well as products produced for other rms, using
inputs provided by these other rms. The advantage of using this denition is that it nicely corresponds
to the cost of materials coming from the balance sheet data. For example, the value of products produced
internally and to be used in other production processes within the rm is part of the cost of materials while
products produced for other rms, using inputs provided by these other rms, is neither part of the cost
of materials nor part of a rms sales from the PC data. We aggregate products at the 2-digits-unit of
measurement pairs and split multi-products rms into several single product rms using products revenue
shares as weights (see Appendix A).
3.1 Occupational structure
To recover the occupational structure at the rm level we exploit information from the matched employer-
employee data set. Each worker, in each year, has to be assigned to a category following a (compulsory)
classication of workers dened by the Portuguese law.14 Classication is based on the tasks performed
13The Ministry of Employment implements several checks to ensure that a rm that has already reported to the database is
not assigned a di¤erent identication number. Similarly, each worker also has a unique identier, based on a workers social
security number. The administrative nature of the data and their public availability at the workplace as required by the
law imply a high degree of coverage and reliability. It is well known that employer-reported wage information is subject to
less measurement error than worker-reported data. The public availability requirement facilitates the work of the services of
the Ministry of Employment that monitor the compliance of rms with the law.
14Following CMRH we use occupational categories to identify layers of management. In the case of French rms, CMRH use
the PCS classication. In this study we use the Portuguese classication (Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd 1978) which is not
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and skill requirements, and each category can be considered as a level in a hierarchy dened in terms of
increasing responsibility and task complexity. Table A.1 in Appendix A contains more detail about the
exact construction of these categories.
On the basis of the hierarchical classication and taking into consideration the actual wage distribution,
we partition the available categories into management layers. We assign Top executives (top management)
to occupation 3; Intermediary executives (middle management)and Supervisors, team leadersto occu-
pation 2; Higher-skilled professionalsand some Skilled professionalsto occupation 1; and the remaining
employees, including Skilled professionals, Semi-skilled professionals, Non-skilled professionals, and
Apprenticeshipto occupation 0.
We then translate the number of di¤erent occupations present in a rm into layers of management. A
rm reporting c occupational categories will be said to have L = c  1 layers of management: hence, in our
data we will have rms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in CMRH). In terms of layers within
a rm we do not keep track of the specic occupational categories but simply rank them. Hence a rm with
occupational categories 2 and 0 will have 1 layer of management, and its organization will consist of a layer
0 corresponding to some skilled and non-skilled professionals, and a layer 1 corresponding to intermediary
executives and supervisors.15
Table 1 presents some basic statistics for Sample 1 for the ten years spanned by our data. The data
exhibits some clear trends over time. In particular, the number of rms declines and rms tend to become
larger. In all our regressions we control for time and industry xed e¤ects.
Table 1: Firm-level data description by year
Mean
Year Firms Value Added Hours Wage # of layers
1996 8,061 1,278 102,766 4.37 1.25
1997 8,797 1,227 91,849 4.48 1.20
1998 7,884 1,397 96,463 4.81 1.28
1999 7,053 1,598 105,003 4.93 1.31
2000 4,875 2,326 139,351 5.13 1.62
2002 4,594 2,490 125,392 5.63 1.62
2003 4,539 2,363 124,271 5.65 1.70
2004 4,610 2,389 124,580 5.82 1.74
2005 3,962 2,637 129,868 6.01 1.76
Notes: Value added in 2005 euros. Wage is average hourly wage in 2005
euros.
the ISCO.
15One potential concern with this methodology to measure the number of layers is that many rms will have layers with
occupations that are not adjacent in the rank. This does not seem to be a large problem. More than 75% of rms have adjacent
layers.
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4 Portuguese Production Hierarchies: Basic Facts
In this section we reproduce some of the main results in CMRH for France using our data for Portugal in
Sample 1. These results underscore our claim that the concept of layers we use is meaningful. We show
this by presenting evidence that shows, rst, that rms with di¤erent numbers of layers are systematically
di¤erent in a variety of dimensions; second, that rms change layers in a systematic and expected way;
third, that the workforce within a layer responds as expected as rms add or subtract layers. This evidence
makes us condent that interpreting the adding and dropping of layers in data as a rm reorganization is
warranted by the evidence.
Table 2: Firm-level data description by number of layers
Mean Median
# of layers Firm-years Value added Hours Wage Wage
0 14,594 267.2 12,120.7 3.55 3.16
1 14,619 648.4 31,532.0 4.03 3.64
2 12,144 2,022.7 96,605.2 4.51 4.11
3 13,018 10,286.2 327,166.8 5.73 5.20
Notes: Value added in 000s of 2005 euros. Wage is either average or
median hourly wage in 2005 euros. Hours are yearly.
Table 2 presents the number of rm-year observations by number of management layers as well as average
value added, hours, and wages. It also presents the median wage given that the wage distribution can be
sometimes very skewed. The evidence clearly shows that rms with more layers are larger in terms of value
added and hours. It also shows that rms with more layers pay on average higher wages.
Figures 5 to 7 present the distributions of value added, employment and the hourly wage by layer. The
distributions are clearly ordered. The distributions for rms with more layers are shifted to the right and
exhibit higher variance. In Figure 6 the modes in the distribution of hours corresponds to the number of
hours of one full-time employee, two full-time employees, etc. The gures show that rms with di¤erent
numbers of layers are in fact very di¤erent. The notion of layers seems to be capturing a stark distinction
among rms.
Our denition of layers of management is supposed to capture the hierarchical structure of the rm. So
it is important to verify that the implied hierarchies are pyramidal in the sense that lower layers employ
more hours and pay lower hourly wages. Table 3 shows that the implied hierarchical structure of rms is
hierarchical in the majority of cases. Furthermore, the implied ranking holds for 76% of the cases when
comparing any individual pair of layers. Similarly, Table 4 shows that lower layers command lower wages
in the vast majority of cases. We conclude that, although perhaps with some imprecision, our denition of
layers does a good job in capturing the hierarchical structure of rms.
Our primary goal is to study the endogenous productivity responses of rm that reorganize. So it is
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Figure 6: Employment (Hours) Density
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important to establish how often they do so. Table 5 presents a transition matrix across layers. In a given
year about half the total number of rms keep the same number of layers, with the number increasing to
70% for rms with 4 layers (3 layers of management). Most of the rms that do not reorganize just exit, with
the percentage of exiting rms declining with the number of layers. About 12% of rms in a layer reorganize
15
Figure 7: Hourly Wage Density
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Table 3: Percentage of rms that satisfy a hierarchy in hours
# of layers N lL  N l+1L all l N0L  N1L N1L  N2L N2L  N3L
1 91.64 91.64  
2 69.62 92.07 77.35 
3 50.51 88.70 74.34 83.65
N lL = hours at layer l of a rm with L layers.
by adding a layer, and about the same number downscale and drop one. Overall, as in France, there seem
to be many reorganizations in the data. Every year around 20% of rms add and drop occupations, and
therefore restructure their labor force (the number is lower for rms with 3 layers of management since,
given that the maximum number of management layers is 3, they can only drop layers).
A reorganization is accompanied with many other rm-level changes. In Table 6 we divide rms depend-
ing on whether they add, do not change, or drop layers, and present measured changes in the total number
Table 4: Percentage of rms that satisfy a hierarchy in wages
# of layers wlL  wl+1L all l w0L  w1L w1L  w2L w2L  w3L
1 75.87 75.87  
2 65.66 85.21 79.57 
3 67.11 92.36 84.62 87.82
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Table 5: Distribution of layers at t+ 1 conditional on layers at t
# of layers at t+ 1
Exit 0 1 2 3 Total
0 31.19 54.29 12.54 1.69 0.29 100.00
1 25.75 10.26 51.12 11.35 1.51 100.00
# of layers at t 2 21.73 1.49 12.06 49.62 15.09 100.00
3 15.68 0.37 1.46 12.90 69.59 100.00
New 85.08 5.31 3.77 3.01 2.83 100.00
of hours, number of hours normalized by the number of hours in the top layer, value added, and average
wages. For all these measures we present changes after de-trending in order to control for the time trends in
the data that we highlighted before. First, note that rms that either expand or contract substantially tend
to reorganize. This is the case both in terms of hours or in terms of value added. Furthermore, changes
in either hours or value added seem to be symmetric, but with opposite sign, for rms that add and drop
layers. Finally, rms that add layers tend to pay higher wages. However, once we de-trend, it is clear that
wages in the preexisting layers decline. So average wages increase because the agents in the new layer earn
more than the average but workers in preexisting layers earn less as their knowledge is now less useful (as
found for France in CMRH).
Table 6: Changes in rm-level outcomes
# of layers All Increase L No Change in L Decrease L
dln total hours -0.0068a 0.2419a -0.0080a -0.2992a
- detrended 0.2472a -0.0011 -0.2911a
dln normalized hours 0.0099b 1.0890a -0.0204a -1.1043a
- detrended 1.0761a -0.0299a -1.1128a
dlnVA 0.0173a 0.0509a 0.0155a -0.0126a
- detrended 0.0323a -0.0013 -0.0307a
dln avg. wage 0.0369a 0.0683a 0.0348a 0.0122a
- detrended 0.0303a -0.0018c -0.0253a
common layers 0.0356a 0.0068b 0.0348a 0.0750a
- detrended -0.0295a -0.0005 0.0387a
Notes: a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
The results above can be further rened by looking at layer-level outcomes for rms that expand without
reorganizing and rms that expand as a result of a reorganization. The theory predicts that rms that expand
but keep the same number of layers will increase employment and wages in all layers. In contrast, rms
that expand and add layers, will increase employment in all layers but will decrease wages (and according to
the theory, knowledge) in all preexisting layers. That is, adding a layer allows the rm to economize on the
knowledge of all the preexisting layers. Tables 7 and 8 present the elasticity of normalized hours (hours at
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each layer relative to the top layer) and wages, respectively, to value added for rms that do not add layers.
The rst column indicates the number of layers in the rm, and the second the particular layer for which
the elasticity is calculated. The theory predicts that all elasticities should be positive. This prediction is
conrmed for all elasticities except for one case where the estimate is not signicant. Hence, we conclude
that rms that grow without reorganizing increase employment and wages in all layers.
Table 7: Elasticity of n`L with respect to value added for rms that do not change L
# of layers Layer Elasticity # observations
1 0 0.1155a 6,351
2 0 0.1146a 4,998
2 1 -0.0147 4,998
3 0 0.1760a 7,079
3 1 0.0847a 7,079
3 2 0.0987a 7,079
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table 8: Elasticity of w`L with respect to value added for rms that do not change L
# of layers Layer Elasticity # observations
0 0 0.0056 6,987
1 0 0.0216a 6,351
1 1 0.0283a 6,351
2 0 0.0150b 4,998
2 1 0.0229b 4,998
2 2 0.0303b 4,998
3 0 0.0225a 7,079
3 1 0.0201a 7,079
3 2 0.0298a 7,079
3 3 0.0199b 7,079
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Tables 9 and 10 show changes in normalized hours and wages when rms reorganize. The tables show
the total number of layers before and after the reorganization, as well as the layer for which the log-change
is computed. As emphasized before, adding layers should lead to increases in employment but declines in
wages in all preexisting layers. These implications are veried for all transitions in all layers except for two
non-signicant results for rms that start with zero layers of management. Similar to the results in CMRH
for France, our estimates for Portugal show that rms that add layers in fact concentrate workersknowledge,
as proxied by their wages, on the top layers. This is one of the consequences of a rm reorganization and
supports empirically the underlying mechanism that, we hypothesize, leads to an increase (decrease) in
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quantity-based productivity as a result of a reorganization that adds (drops) layers.
Table 9: d lnn`Lit for rms that transition
# of layers Layer d lnn`Lit # observations
before after
0 1 0 1.2777a 1,614
0 2 0 1.6705a 218
0 3 0 2.3055a 37
1 0 0 -1.2304a 1,275
1 2 0 0.5178a 1,410
1 2 1 0.4920a 1,410
1 3 0 0.9402a 188
1 3 1 0.8367a 188
2 0 0 -1.6449a 150
2 1 0 -0.5645a 1,215
2 1 1 -0.5060a 1,215
2 3 0 0.6806a 1,520
2 3 1 0.7098a 1,520
2 3 2 0.6340a 1,520
3 0 0 -2.5187a 38
3 1 0 -0.9772a 149
3 1 1 -0.8636a 149
3 2 0 -0.7977a 1,312
3 2 1 -0.7532a 1,312
3 2 2 -0.6465a 1,312
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
5 Changes in Productivity
We now present our methodology to measure changes in revenue-based and quantity-based productivity.
The measurement of revenue productivity has received a lot of attention in the industrial organization
literature, and so we expand standard methodologies to account for the role of layers. Measuring quantity-
based productivity is more involved and requires more detailed data. We address each measurement exercise
in turn.16
We use two complementary approaches to select comparable groups of rms. The rst approach uses
sequences of rm-years with either one or zero changes in layers. We dene a sequence of type L L0 as the
16The main insight in CRH is that reorganization increases quantity-based-productivity via a reduction in marginal costs.
This in turn translates into a reduction in prices that lowers revenue-based productivity. Therefore, with information on prices
one might be tempted to look at how rm level prices change as rms change their organization. However, prices change as a
consequence of supply side shifters, like costs, as well as other demand side shifters, like markups and taste shocks. As a result,
prices might be a noisy measure of rmsperformance. We instead focus on measuring changes in quanty-based productivity
and use the methodology in MULAMA to account for di¤erent demand and supply side shocks.
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Table 10: d lnw`Lit for rms that transition
# of layers Layer d lnw`Lit # observations
before after
0 1 0 0.0062 1,614
0 2 0 0.0207 218
0 3 0 -.1878a 37
1 0 0 0.0557a 1,275
1 2 0 0.0038 1,410
1 2 1 -0.0624a 1,410
1 3 0 -0.0230a 188
1 3 1 -0.1710a 188
2 0 0 0.0692a 150
2 1 0 0.0373a 1,215
2 1 1 0.1192a 1,215
2 3 0 -0.0015 1,520
2 3 1 -0.0113b 1,520
2 3 2 -0.0676a 1,520
3 0 0 0.2673a 38
3 1 0 0.0691a 149
3 1 1 0.1672a 149
3 2 0 0.0313a 1,312
3 2 1 0.0467a 1,312
3 2 2 0.1114a 1,312
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
series of years in which a rm has the same consecutively observed number of management layers L plus
the adjacent series of years in which a rm has the same consecutively observed number of management
layers L0. For example, a rm that we observed all years between 1996 and 2000 and that has zero layers
in 1996, 1997, and 2000 and one layer in 1998 and 1999 would have two sequences: A 0-1 sequence (1996
to 1999) as well as a 1-0 sequence (1998 to 2000). Firms that never change layers in our sample form a
constant-layer sequence. We then calculate our results using rm-product-sequence xed e¤ects for Sample
2 and rm-sequence xed-e¤ects for Sample 1.
The second approach groups rms according to the number of layers (0, 1, 2 or 3) the rm has in the year
of the rst observed reorganization. We then present results for each of these groups using rm-product
xed e¤ects. On top of these xed e¤ects, in both approaches we use a battery of industry or product
group dummies as well as time dummies. Throughout, standard errors are clustered at the rm-level.
Bootstrapped standard errors are virtually identical to rm-clustered ones.
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5.1 Revenue-based Productivity
The Cobb-Douglas production function for rm i in period t introduced in equation (1) can be expressed in
logs as
qit = ait + Ooit + Mmit + (   M   O)kit (6)
where ait denotes productivity, oit the log of the labor input, mit the log of materials, and kit the log of
capital.
The labor input Oit is not directly observable, but we can use the fact that
Oit =
C (Oit;w)
C (Oit;w)
Oit =
C (Oit;w)
AC (Oit;w)
: (7)
The numerator of this expression, C (Oit;w), is the total expenditure on the labor input, i.e., the total wage
bill of the rm (which is observable in standard data) while the denominator, AC (Oit;w) = C (Oit;w) =Oit;
is the unit cost of the labor input (which is, by contrast, unobservable). Substituting this into the production
function and multiplying by the price leads to an equation for revenue given by
rit = ait + O lnC (Oit;w) + Mmit + (   M   O)kit; (8)
where ait  pit+ait O lnAC (Oit;w) = pit+ait+Lit denotes revenue-based productivity and C (Oit;w)
is the total wage bill of the rm. Note that  O lnAC (Oit;w) = Lit is what is implied by the CRH
model if we substitute the constraint (5) in the organizational problem with nLL  ; for small enough  > 0:
Therefore, we assume that revenue-based productivity follows the process
ait = aait 1 + Lit + ait; (9)
where ait is a productivity shock that is i.i.d. across rms and time, uncorrelated with all past values of
ait and Lit but correlated with the number of layers in t. Indeed, a rm will optimally choose the number
of layers in t depending on, among others, the realization of ait.
We also assume that capital is predetermined in t and that rms optimally choose materials and the
labor input in order to minimize short-run costs. The cost of materials is common across rms but can vary
over time while the unit cost of the labor input AC (Oit;w) varies across rms and time. From rst-order
cost minimization conditions we have that materialschoice mit is a function of kit and ait. After inverting
the rst-order conditions of the rm we can express ait as a function of capital and materials, namely,
ait = g(kit;mit).
Using revenue (or value added) data we can then estimate the revenue-based productivity process, ait;
which should decline with the number of layers, as described above. The literature has proposed several
ways to estimate revenue productivity. Below we use simple measures as revenue per worker as well as
the methodology of Wooldridge (2009) to deal with the endogeneity in input use. Similar results can be
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Table 11: Revenue Labor Productivity. Firm-product-sequence FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.073b -0.016 0.090c 0.055b
(0 .035) (0 .059) (0 .053) (0 .027)
Number of management layers t -0.090a -0.258a -0.151a
(0 .017) (0 .040) (0 .018)
Constant 10.795a 11.924a 10.527a 11.109a
(0 .393) (0 .659) (0 .617) (0 .303)
Observations 4,206 2,750 3,090 10,046
Number of xed e¤ects 1,687 1,289 1,310 4,286
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.151 0.026 0.060
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
obtained using either value added per worker, OLS Revenue TFP or the methodology in Olley and Pakes
(1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and DeLoecker and Warzynski (2012). See Appendix A for further
details.
The rst set of results is presented in Table 11. The measure of revenue-based productivity is revenue per
worker and we present results for sequences in which rms increase, decrease, or keep constant the number
of layers. We also present results for the whole sample. The number of layers is signicantly related to lower
revenue-based productivity. Revenue-based productivity decreases by about 9% when rms add a layer and
increases by about 25% when they drop one. Note that past revenue-based productivity has a small e¤ect
on current revenue-based productivity given that we are using rm-product-sequence xed e¤ects.17
Table 12 presents the results for the alternative grouping. It presents the e¤ect of layers on productivity
as a function of the number of layers after we see the rm switching for the rst time. The coe¢ cient
on layers is again negative and highly signicant for rms with any initial number of layers. Revenue
productivity declines by about 12% when rms add a layer, although the number increases to 18% for the
largest rms with 3 layers (this last coe¢ cient is identied only from rms that drop layers since 3 layers is
the maximum number of layers in our measure).
Of course, there are many potential objections to using revenue per worker as the relevant measure of
revenue productivity. In particular, as Olley and Pakes (1996) famously argued, there are other inputs and
their use is endogenous to the level of productivity of the rm. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose a
methodology to deal with this problem using the rst-order conditions of the rm input choice problem
with respect to the variable inputs.
We use the variant of this methodology proposed by Wooldridge (2009).18 If we subtract the value
17This result also holds for all subsequent Tables. When not using xed e¤ects we nd standard auto-regressive coe¢ cients
of around 0.8 and R2 of about 0.7.
18Wooldridge (2009) builds on Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg et al. (2007) and shows
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Table 12: Revenue Labor Productivity. Firm-product FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 -0.070 0.171a 0.107b 0.016
(0 .059) (0 .047) (0 .048) (0 .067)
Number of management layers t -0.103b -0.121a -0.115a -0.187a
(0 .045) (0 .023) (0 .021) (0 .037)
Constant 12.017a 9.587a 10.446a 11.891a
(0 .674) (0 .537) (0 .551) (0 .797)
Observations 533 1,665 3,690 3,569
Number of xed e¤ects 164 552 1,157 1,161
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.087 0.061 0.093
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
of materials from revenue to obtain value added, vait; we can estimate a value added-based production
function featuring two inputs (the labor input and capital) and one proxy variable (materials). Building
on the production function in (8) and given (9) as well as the inverted input demand equation of the rm,
ait 1 = g(kit 1;mit 1); we obtain
vait = O lnC (Oit;w) + (   M   O)kit + ag(kit 1;mit 1) + Lit + ait: (10)
Under our assumptions, the error term ait in (9) is uncorrelated with kit andmit 1. Hence, g(kit 1;mit 1)
is also uncorrelated with ait. The wage bill C (Oit;w) and the number of layers at t; Lit; are instead en-
dogenous and we instrument them with the wage bill at t   1 and the number of layers in t   1. As for
the term ag(kit 1;mit 1) we use a second order polynomial approximation in kit 1 and mit 1. We nally
estimate (10) by IV and ultimately get an estimate of revenue TFP as
ba = vait   ^O lnC (Oit;w)  ^Kkit:
Table 13 shows that adding a layer reduces revenue-based productivity by about 5%, while dropping
one increases it slightly less than 14%. The overall e¤ect of changing a layer is 8% and highly signicant.
These results are qualitatively the same, but quantitatively somewhat smaller than the ones we obtained
for revenue labor productivity.
When grouping according to the initial number of layers, Table 14 shows that the e¤ect of an extra layer
decreases revenue-based productivity by between 4 and 9% with the number increasing for higher layers
(which is probably the result of downward transitions having larger e¤ects than upward transitions). The
how to obtain consistent estimates of input elasticities with a one-step GMM procedure. The results are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar if we simply implement the methodology in Olley and Pakes (1996).
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Table 13: Wooldridge Revenue TFP. Firm-product-sequence FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.092b -0.077c 0.070 0.044c
(0 .041) (0 .046) (0 .044) (0 .026)
Number of management layers t -0.049a -0.138a -0.082a
(0 .014) (0 .022) (0 .011)
Constant 0.056 0.137a -0.025 0.261a
(0 .041) (0 .039) (0 .016) (0 .029)
Observations 4,127 2,708 2,989 9,824
Number of xed e¤ects 1,655 1,268 1,276 4,199
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.063 0.032 0.042
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table 14: Wooldridge Revenue TFP. Firm-product FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 -0.041 0.011 0.123a 0.139a
(0 .061) (0 .060) (0 .039) (0 .046)
Number of management layers t -0.063a -0.039c -0.067a -0.093a
(0 .022) (0 .021) (0 .013) (0 .024)
Constant 0.096b 0.023 0.108a 0.319a
(0 .040) (0 .055) (0 .032) (0 .069)
Observations 528 1,630 3,645 3,446
Number of xed e¤ects 162 543 1,138 1,122
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.026 0.060 0.057
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
results are again consistent with our ndings for revenue per worker, although clearly smaller in magnitude.
Overall these results paint a very consistent picture. Revenue-based productivity decreases with a
reorganization that adds layers by somewhat between 4 and 9%. The result varies somewhat by layer and
depending on whether rms add or drop layers and their initial number of layers. Furthermore, taking
care of multiple inputs and adjusting for the endogenous choice of materials and labor is important as
well, and reduces the absolute magnitude of the estimated e¤ect of a reorganization. Nevertheless, the
main result that revenue productivity jumps in the opposite direction as the number of layers is very robust
across specications and exercises. Clearly, revenue productivity can jump down either because rms reduce
their prices or, perhaps, because quantity-base productivity goes down (a result that would contradict our
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hypothesis). Thus, we now proceed to estimate the e¤ect of a reorganization on quantity-based productivity.
5.2 Quantity-based Productivity
Measuring quantity-based productivity well is hard partly because we need information about prices and
quantities. And partly because we need to account properly for other types of shocks that rms face like
demand and markup shocks that will a¤ect its pricing and production decisions. The empirical implications
derived from the theory that we outlined above crucially depends on accounting well for heterogeneity
and shocks in demand and their potential correlation with exogenous productivity and other shocks. So
it is important to choose a methodology that allows for correlation between demand and productivity
disturbances. To do so we follow Forlani et al., (2014) that impose su¢ cient structure to compute quantity-
based productivity in the presence of potentially correlated productivity, demand and markup shocks. We
start with a description of the baseline methodology and subsequently expand on its application by explicitly
considering the role of organization in producing the labor input.
5.2.1 Baseline MULAMA
Following Forlani et al. (2014) we use a two-stage estimation procedure to obtain quantity-based pro-
ductivity. Our approach allows us to explicitly take into account the presence of demand shocks and
markup heterogeneity across rms. We do this by both assuming costs minimization, which provides a
useful way of computing markups as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2011), and by imposing some restric-
tions on the way demand shocks enter utility. In our case we simply have that log revenue is given by
rit = pit + qit =
1
it
(it + qit); where it is the demand shock to rm i at time t: That is, demand shocks
enter log-linearly in the revenue equation, along with quantity, and both multiply the inverse of the markup.
Forlani et al. (2014) show how this holds as a rst-order linear approximation in a variety of circumstances.
Recall the production function in equation (6) and assume the following quantity-based productivity
process: ait = aait 1 + ait. Furthermore, assume that demand for the product of rm i at time t, in logs,
is given by
pit =

1  1
it

it   1
it
qit
where it denotes the level of demand and it the elasticity of demand. We assume that
it = it 1 + it;
where it is an idiosyncratic demand shock that can be correlated with the productivity shock ait. The
rm operates in a monopolistically competitive market, so its markup is given by
it =
it
it   1
:
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Thus, heterogeneity or shocks in the elasticity of demand will result in variation in markups across rms
and time.
Cost minimization implies, for the exible inputs (which in our model are the labor input and materials),
that
O
it
=
OitMC (Oit;w)
PitQit
;
and
M
it
=
MitPMt
PitQit
;
where MC (Oit;w) is the marginal cost of the labor input and PMt denotes the price of materials. Note
thatMitPMt is the total expenditure on materials, and OitMC (Oit;w) is the total expenditure on the labor
input when we allow nLL  ; for  > 0 (since the unit and marginal cost coincide at the MES): Given that
we observe the total expenditure on the labor input, this is the case that we consider throughout.
With this structure in hand, we can proceed to measure quantity-based productivity using data on
quantities, revenue, labor, capital, material and expenditure shares.
Denote
LHSit =
rit   sOit (oit   kit)  sMit (mit   kit)
sMit
;
where sxit is the share in expenditure of input x. After some manipulations of the revenue equation we can
obtain an expression for LHSit that we can estimate in the rst stage. Namely,
LHSit = b1z1it + b2z2it + b3z3it + b4z4it + b5z5it + uit; (11)
where z1it = kit; z2it = LHSit 1; z3it = kit 1; z4it =
rit 1
sMit 1 ; z5it = qit 1; uit = (ait + it) =M : Appendix
B presents a detailed derivation of equation (11). Note that we can simply use OLS to estimate equation
(11) since uit is not correlated with the covariates. This equation allows us to identify several of the models
parameters. From the estimates of this equation we can identify all the parameters since b^1 =

M
; b^2 = a;
b^3 =  a M ; b^4 =    a; and b^5 =
 +a
M
.
Using b^1 and b^2 we can implement a second stage to separately identify  where we use the productivity
process and the production function to obtain
qit   b^2qit 1 = b6z6it + ait
where
z6it =
oit   kit
b^1
sOit
sMit
+
mit   kit
b^1
+ kit +
b^2
b^1
LHSit 1   b^2kit 1   rit 1b^2
b^1sMit 1
;
with b6 = .19 Note that since kit is predetermined in t we can instrument for z6it with kit. This is what
19Note that, alternatively, we could have used a combination of the estimates in the rst stage to obtain an estimate of
, instead of using a second stage. This alternative methodology is in general not as robust and precise, since it involves
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we do using the instrumental variables (IV) estimator.
Then, our estimate of productivity is given by
a^it = qit   b^6
b^1
sOit
sMit
(oit   kit)  b^6
b^1
(mit   kit)  b^6kit;
our estimate of demand shocks by
^it =
b^6
b^1sMit
rit   qit;
and our estimate of markups by
^it =
b^6
b^1sMit
:
The basic estimation methodology that we just described is amenable to various generalizations. In
particular we can allow for a translog production function and can allow for a quadratic rather than the
linear dependence of the productivity process on past productivity.
5.2.2 Changes in layers in MULAMA
The methodology to estimate quantity productivity introduced above does not incorporate the e¤ect of
changes in organization in the labor input. To do so, we parallel what we did in Section 5.1, but use two
distinct variants. In Case 1, we proxy for the organizational part of productivity using quantity. In Case 2,
we do exactly what we did in the case of revenue-based productivity and use the number of layers.
Case 1 The labor input corresponds to the output of the knowledge-based hierarchy, namely F
 
ZLLit

n0Lit:
So,
qit = ~ait + O lnn
0
Lit + Mmit + (   M   O)kit;
where ~ait = ait+O lnF
 
ZLLit

denotes quantity-based productivity. Note that quantity -based productivity
~ait now incorporates the e¤ect of changes in organization in the labor input via lnF
 
ZLLit

. Furthermore,
since every value of lnF
 
ZLLit

corresponds to a value of qit we account for this by assuming that the
autoregressive process for ~ait is given by
~ait = a~ait 1 + qit + ait; (12)
and we use the number of layer-zero employees, n0Lit, as our measure of the labor input. We adjust the
estimation of quantity-based productivity described above to take into account the dependence of the process
of productivity on the quantity produced.20
multiplications and divisions of estimated coe¢ cients as well as a di¤erence between  and a that is signicantly di¤erent
from zero.
20See Appendix B for further details.
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Table 15: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 1. Firm-product-sequence FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.398b -0.120 0.519a 0.284b
(0 .155) (0 .097) (0 .102) (0 .132)
Quantity t 0.527a 0.478a 0.301 0.445a
(0 .124) (0 .128) (0 .187) (0 .107)
Constant -7.531a -6.966a -4.459 -6.345a
(1 .761) (1 .840) (2 .757) (1 .528)
Observations 4,171 2,840 3,055 10,066
Number of xed e¤ects 1,673 1,280 1,298 4,251
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.039 0.338 0.108
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
A note of caution is in order. There are many potential reasons for why the quantity produced can a¤ect
productivity. For example, standard learning-by-doing theories would have very similar implications. In-
creasing returns, in contrast, is not a potential explanation given that we account for them in our estimation
strategy. Our aim here is to rst measure the e¤ect of physical quantity on productivity and assess whether
this dependence is related to a rms reorganization. If the reason quantity-based productivity depends on
quantity is not related to reorganization, conditioning on the changes in the number of layers should not
a¤ect the results. If, conversely, the e¤ect of quantity on productivity is signicantly di¤erent depending on
whether the rm reorganizes or not, we can claim that part of this relationship is related to our mechanism.
Table 15 presents the results using rm-product-sequence xed e¤ects. As before, it divides the observa-
tions in sequences in which the number of layers increased, decreased, or stayed the same. It also presents
results for the whole sample. The results are quite stark. Quantity increases quantity-based productivity
signicantly for rms that add or drop layers, but is not signicantly related to quantity-based productivity
for rms that do not reorganize. The magnitude of the overall e¤ect implies that a 10% change in quantity
increases productivity by about 4.5%. In rms that add layers a 10% increase in quantity increases produc-
tivity by 5.3%, while in rms that drop them only by 4.8%. Note that the coe¢ cient on quantity for rms
that do not reorganize, although not signicant, is positive. This is consistent with alternative explanations
of the link between quantity and quantity-based productivity. Although these alternative explanations do
not receive signicant support in the data once we control for changes in layers. Of course, they could still
be potentially important in determining the timing of a rms reorganization. An argument we return to
when we instrument for changes in organization below.
Table 16 presents the results for the alternative grouping based on the initial number of layers. The
results are, again, encouraging. Quantity a¤ects positively and signicantly quantity-based productivity for
rms with any initial number of layers. Note also that the e¤ect seems to decline with the number of layers.
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Table 16: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 1. Firm-product FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 0.279a 0.056 0.221b 0.526a
(0 .096) (0 .233) (0 .108) (0 .088)
Quantity t 1.603a 0.544a 0.434a 0.315b
(0 .591) (0 .169) (0 .101) (0 .129)
Constant -22.297a -8.034a -5.966a -4.581b
(7 .494) (2 .319) (1 .460) (2 .001)
Observations 532 1,649 3,674 3,523
Number of xed e¤ects 163 549 1,149 1,148
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.017 0.086 0.309
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
This means that reorganizations a¤ect quantity productivity more for rms with smaller numbers of layers.
The e¤ect is particularly large (although also more noisy given the smaller number of observations) for
rms with zero layers. For these rms a 1% increase in quantity leads to a 1.6% increase in quantity-based
productivity.
Case 2 One of the main di¢ culties in interpreting the results for Case 1, that we just described, is that
the mapping between reorganization and quantity is not measured directly. Hence, we do not know the
magnitude of the change in quantity-based productivity that results from a reorganization. Furthermore,
the previous method might confound other e¤ects entering through qit; although we nd no signicant
evidence that this is the case. To address these potential concerns in this case we substitute Oit in the
production function for C (Oit;w) =AC (Oit;w) (as we did for the case of revenue-based productivity, see
Equation 7). We now assume that the process for quantity-based productivity is given by
~ait = a~ait 1 + Lit + ait; (13)
where, as before, we adjust the process for quantity-based productivity to take into account the dependence
on layers, see Appendix B for further details. As we mention before, this is the implication of the theory if
we replace constraint (5) by nLL   > 0; since in this case the average cost function is a step function where
the steps correspond to changes in layers.
Table 17 conrms, for the case of Case 2, our ndings for Case 1. Adding a layer is associated with an
increase of around 4% in quantity-based productivity. The e¤ect is also positive for rms that drop layers
(so their quantity-based productivity declines), although not signicant at the 10% level. Note the high
bar that we are setting for our empirical estimation. We are including a large number of xed e¤ects and
dummies in the estimation, so everything is estimated out of changes in the number of layers for a given
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Table 17: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 2. Firm-product-sequence FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.316a 0.348b 0.359a 0.341a
(0 .056) (0 .170) (0 .092) (0 .067)
Number of management layers t 0.040c 0.013 0.032b
(0 .022) (0 .022) (0 .014)
Constant -0.113c -0.008 -0.001 -0.034
(0 .062) (0 .035) (0 .023) (0 .041)
Observations 4,171 2,840 3,055 10,066
Number of xed e¤ects 1,673 1,280 1,298 4,251
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.111 0.101 0.094
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table 18: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 2. Firm-product FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 0.240a 0.276a 0.408a 0.480a
(0 .066) (0 .056) (0 .061) (0 .099)
Number of management layers t 0.055b -0.013 0.029c 0.049a
(0 .028) (0 .023) (0 .017) (0 .018)
Constant 0.110c 0.063 -0.069 -0.086
(0 .065) (0 .048) (0 .044) (0 .053)
Observations 532 1,649 3,674 3,523
Number of xed e¤ects 163 549 1,149 1,148
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.079 0.140 0.186
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
rm-product-sequence. Furthermore given that we are adding time dummies, we are controlling for any
time trend in the data.
In Table 18 we present results grouped by the initial layer. Here the estimates show an overall e¤ect of
layers on quantity-based productivity of between 3 and 5%. Note that for the case of rms with 1 layer our
results are negative, although not signicant. In sum, all the signicant results we have shown in this section
indicate that a reorganization that adds layers has a positive e¤ect on quantity-based productivity, while a
reorganization that drops layers and shrinks the rm has a negative e¤ect on quantity-based productivity.
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Table 19: Wooldridge Revenue TFP: Contemporaneous Firm-product-sequence FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.091b -0.064c 0.065b 0.053b
(0 .038) (0 .038) (0 .041) (0 .024)
Change in quantity -0.033a -0.074a -0.048a
(0 .009) (0 .014) (0 .008)
Constant -0.084a -0.022 0.050b 0.075a
(0 .013) (0 .027) (0 .020) (0 .019)
Observations 4,057 2,686 2,934 9,677
Number of xed e¤ects 1,630 1,258 1,248 4,136
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.042 0.031 0.027
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
5.3 Contemporaneous E¤ects
The previous formulations allow for a slow adjustment of productivity to the number of layers. Namely,
the actual number of layers a¤ects productivity and so a change in the number of layers a¤ects the level
of productivity, conditional on past productivity, in every period afterwards. In the model the e¤ect is not
necessarily a permanent e¤ect, but rather just a level e¤ect in the period of the switch. Hence, we consider
an alternative version for the process of revenue-based and quantity-based productivity where we only
incorporate the change in the number of layers and not their level. That is, in this alternative specications
the change in layers a¤ects the level of productivity in just one period. Namely, the additional layer has only
a contemporaneous level e¤ect. Of course, a potential problem with this specication is that it might fail to
capture protracted e¤ects of changes in layers on productivity. This is why we started with the permanent
case in the previous sub-sections.
Consider rst the case of revenue-based productivity. The process for revenue-based productivity in
equation (9), when we only consider contemporaneous e¤ects, becomes
ait = a ait 1 + Lit + ait: (14)
We can use the process (14) and the methodology of Wooldridge (2009) to recompute the revenue-based
productivity process. The results are presented in Table 19 and 20. The ndings in Table 19 are consistent
with our hypothesis and all highly signicant. The e¤ect of a change in layers on revenue-based productivity
is negative for rms that either increase or drop layers. Note also that the e¤ects are somewhat smaller than
in Table 13. This is natural given that rms change the number of layers in most cases by only one layer,
while the average number of layers is between 1.20 and 1.76 as we saw in Table 1. Once we take this e¤ect
into account the contemporaneous e¤ect is similar, although still bit smaller than the permanent ones.
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Table 20: Wooldridge Revenue TFP: Contemporaneous. Firm-product FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 0.001 0.015 0.185a 0.126a
(0 .044) (0 .048) (0 .042) (0 .039)
Change in quantity -0.047a -0.021 -0.038a -0.055a
(0 .018) (0 .015) (0 .008) (0 .012)
Constant 0.004 -0.035a -0.057a 0.048a
(0 .032) (0 .027) (0 .012) (0 .015)
Observations 525 1,602 3,591 3,385
Number of xed e¤ects 159 535 1,119 1,096
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.011 0.059 0.040
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table 20 presents the results ordered by layer. The results are, again, all negative. Note that for rms
that start with zero, two, or three layers, the coe¢ cients are all signicant, while the estimate for rms with
one layer is not signicant. The imprecision in the estimate of the contemporaneous e¤ect might be the
result of the relatively smaller sample size compared to groups of rms with 2 and 3 layers.
Consider now a similar modication in our estimation of quantity-based productivity. When we only
consider contemporaneous e¤ects, the process for quantity-based productivity in equation (13) becomes
~ait = a~ait 1 + Lit + ait: (15)
We can use the process in (15) and recompute all the shocks in the model using the MULAMA methodology
described above.21 Tables 21 and 22 present the two sets of results. The e¤ect in Table 21 is again somewhat
smaller than what we found for the permanent case in Table 17, but positive for the whole sample of rms
as well as for rms that add or drop layers. It is not signicant for the rms that reorganize and add layers.
The overall estimated magnitude of the contemporaneous e¤ect of an extra layer is around 1.5%.
The results in Table 22 are somewhat mixed. Again all the signicant results are positive, although the
e¤ect of changes in layers is not signicant for rms that start with zero or 1 management layers. As before,
this is probably the result of the large number of xed e¤ects that we are using, combined with the smaller
samples for rms with zero or one layer. Still, our estimates indicate that a reorganization that adds layers,
whenever we can measure it somewhat precisely, always leads to an increase in quantity-based productivity.
21 In addition, Appendix C presents the results for the contemporaneous Case 1, where
~ait = a ~ait 1 + qit + ait:
The results for this case are all aligned with the theory. Yet, as discussed before, the results for quantity are necessary, but
not su¢ cient, to claim that quantity-based productivity responds positively to a reorganization that adds layers. Therefore, for
brevity, we decided to present Case 2 in the main text, and relegated Case 1 to the Appendix.
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Table 21: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 2 Cont. Firm-product-sequence FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.207a 0.103 0.162a 0.163a
(0 .043) (0 .070) (0 .055) (0 .034)
Change in layers 0.007 0.021c 0.014c
(0 .011) (0 .011) (0 .008)
Constant 0.001 0.041 0.032 0.040
(0 .016) (0 .037) (0 .019) (0 .025)
Observations 4,171 2,840 3,055 10,066
Number of xed e¤ects 1,673 1,280 1,298 4,251
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.012 0.030 0.027
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table 22: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 2 Contemporaneous. Firm-product FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 0.154b 0.226a 0.263a 0.215a
(0 .067) (0 .062) (0 .039) (0 .059)
Change in layers -0.003 0.004 0.023a 0.027b
(0 .016) (0 .013) (0 .009) (0 .011)
Constant 0.209a 0.080a -0.015 0.041c
(0 .049) (0 .023) (0 .015) (0 .022)
Observations 532 1,649 3,674 3,523
Number of xed e¤ects 163 549 1,149 1,148
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.062 0.069 0.051
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
5.4 Instrumental Variables
The results so far have shown, we believe, that a set of detailed and specic predictions on revenue-based
and quantity-based productivity changes as a result of a rms reorganization are robustly present in the
data. The fact that when we see rms adding layers revenue-based productivity declines but quantity-based
productivity increases, and that this is signicantly the case after including a large battery of xed e¤ects,
lends credibility to the causal interpretation that our theory provides for these facts. Still, we cannot rule out
the possibility that a positive shock to quantity-based productivity leads to an increase in layers (although
it would still be hard to explain why revenue-productivity falls independent of the reorganization). More
specically, it can be the case that the reorganization of a rm (as measured by changes in quantity in Case
1 and the number of layers in Case 2) is the result of the innovations, ait; in equations (9) and (12) to (15).
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Table 23: Wooldridge Revenue TFP: Contemporaneous with IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.775a 0.781a 0.794a 0.792a
(0 .023) (0 .033) (0 .022) (0 .016)
Change in layers -0.047b -0.083a -0.054a
(0 .014) (0 .019) (0 .013)
Observations 3,653 2,365 2,020 8,038
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.490 0.581 0.589
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
The structural assumptions we have used above provide us with a set of instrumental variables for a
reorganization. In particular, for the contemporaneous e¤ects in equations (14) and (15) we can use: the
number of layers in t 1; quantity, revenue, demand shocks and markups at time t 1; capital at time t; and
productivity at time t  2. We can also use all these variables lagged to the rst year available. Note that
it is important that we use the productivity process in (14) and (15) where the change in layers, not the
number of layers, has an e¤ect on productivity.22 In these specications layer changes have a direct e¤ect
on productivity only in period t and so we can use the past number of layers to instrument for a change in
layers. Otherwise the e¤ect of a change in layers could still be endogenous to current innovations and so all
these variables (except perhaps the ones for the initial period) are not valid instruments.
Note also that since we are using this battery of instrumental variables as well as past productivity, the
set of xed e¤ects we used in the previous regression are not obviously necessary. They also reduce the
precision of our estimates substantially. So for all results using instrumental variables we drop the set of
rm-level xed e¤ects, although we keep product group and time xed e¤ects in all regressions.23
Table 23 presents the results for the specication of the process of revenue-based productivity in equation
(14), but when we instrument for the change in layers using the variables described above. The estimates
using instrumental variables still deliver a negative relationship between changes in layers and revenue-based
productivity. These results can now be interpreted as causal. So, an extra layer reduces revenue-based
productivity by 4.7%. The results are even more negative and signicant for rms that drop layers. The
average e¤ect across all rms is that a change in layers accounts for a reduction in revenue-based productivity
of 5.4%.
Note also that compared to the previous tables, past revenue-based productivity now plays a much
more signicant role (in line with past estimates of the autoregressive component in the literature) and the
persistence coe¢ cient is around .8. The reason is, of course, that we have dropped the set of rm-product-
22 In Appendix C we also consider Case 1 and instrument for changes in quantity.
23 In all the tables that use instrumental variables we do not present the value of constants since we de-mean all variables.
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Table 24: Wooldridge Revenue TFP: Contemporaneous with IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 0.430a 0.612a 0.812a 0.814a
(0 .079) (0 .034) (0 .023) (0 .016)
Change in layers -0.015 -0.062c -0.052a -0.082a
(0 .031) (0 .037) (0 .020) (0 .023)
Observations 525 1,602 3,591 3,385
Adjusted R2 0.238 0.382 0.584 0.616
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table 25: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 2 Contemporaneous with IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.907a 0.880a 0.923a 0.908a
(0 .011) (0 .018) (0 .015) (0 .009)
Change in layers 0.044a 0.060b 0.066a
(0 .017) (0 .026) (0 .017)
Observations 3,748 2,181 2,098 8,027
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.723 0.860 0.791
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
sequence xed e¤ects.
Table 24 presents the results when we group by initial layer. All the estimates of the e¤ects of changes in
layers are negative, once more indicating that there is a causal e¤ect of changes in layers on revenue-based
productivity. However, the estimates for rms with zero layers are again not signicant. As before, this
might be the result of the relatively smaller number of observations.
Perhaps more revealing are the results when we use the process for quantity-based productivity in (15).
These results, presented in Table 25 are very supportive of the theory and show that the causal e¤ects of a
change in layers on productivity is between 4 and 6%. These numbers are larger than the ones we found in
Table 22, indicating perhaps that the xed e¤ects in those results where capturing some of the e¤ect of the
change in layers. In this case, the autorregressive coe¢ cient is very signicant and around .9 for all cases.
Our last set of results is presented in Table 26 where we group rms by their initial number of layers
but use the contemporaneous e¤ects version of Case 2. As we have in a series of tables with groupings by
layer, the small number of observations imply that the results for zero and one layers are not signicant.
However, the results for rms with 2 and 3 layers of management are positive and signicant.
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Table 26: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 2 Contemporaneous with IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 0.846a 0.905a 0.884a 0.892a
(0 .048) (0 .020) (0 .013) (0 .014)
Change in layers -0.029 0.030 0.066a 0.046c
(0 .039) (0 .040) (0 .022) (0 .027)
Observations 532 1,649 3,674 3,523
Adjusted R2 0.689 0.780 0.757 0.776
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Overall, throughout our investigation we did not nd any signicant evidence to falsify the hypothesis
proposed by the hierarchy model. All the signicant evidence was in line with the main implications.
Hence, we conclude that when rms receive an exogenous shock that makes them reorganize, quantity-
based productivity increases signicantly. An extra layer increases productivity by around 5%, and a drop
in layers decreases productivity by a similar percentage. As rms reorganize they also expand, move down
their demand curve and reduce prices. This countervailing force results in a decrease in revenue-base
productivity of around 4 percentage points.
5.5 Aggregate Productivity E¤ects from Reorganization
The results in the previous section indicate that reorganizations lead to large changes in quantity-based
productivity conditional on a rms past productivity, its number of layers, and a variety of xed e¤ects. If
we want to gauge the importance of organization for aggregate productivity dynamics, we need to understand
how important is the e¤ect of reoganizations for the average rm that reorganizes. So, for the rms that
reorganize we want to ask how important is the change in productivity that resulted from the reorganization,
compared to changes in productivity due to idiosyncratic shocks, or the mean reversion implied by the process
in (15).
Consider a rm-product i that we observe from t  T to t. Iterating over equation (15) we obtain that
~ait   ~ait T =
 
Ta   1

~ait T + 
XT 1
v=0
vaLit v +
XT 1
v=0
vaait v:
Hence, the overall change in productivity for a rm, given by ~ait   ~ait T ; can be decomposed into three
components. The rst term is a mean reversion component that is negative when ~ait T is positive since
a < 1. Namely, productivity tends to revert to its long term mean given a number of layers. The cumulative
change in productivity due to a reorganization, is given by the second term, namely, 
PT 1
v=0 
v
aLit v: The
third term is just the accumulated e¤ect of past shocks.
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Table 27: Change in Quantity TFP due to Reorganization
Firms that increase layers Firms that reduce layers
Percentiles Overall change Due to reorganization Overall change Due to reorganization
10% -.49 .05 -.53 -.09
25% -.18 .05 -.27 -.06
50% .05 .06 -.04 -.06
75% .32 .07 .20 -.05
90% .67 .11 .52 -.05
Mean 0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.07
Observations 817 817 466 466
We calculate these terms for rms that increase and decrease the number of layers between t   T
and t. Using our results for  and a from the MULAMA Quantity TFP Case 2 Contemporaneous with
Instrumental Variables in column 4 of Table 25 we calculate each of these terms for the whole distribution
of rms. Clearly, the actual change in productivity across rms is very heterogeneous. Some rms that add
layers experiment a large decline in productivity, while some experiment a very large increase. Hence, we
order rms by their overall change in productivity and in Table 27 present the distribution of the overall
changes in productivity and the change in productivity due to changes in layers.24 Columns two and three
present the results for rms that increase layers, while columns four and ve present the results for rms
that drop layers.
The results are stark. On average, or for the median rm, the increase in productivity due to reorgani-
zation explains essentially all of the increase in overall productivity. This is clearly not the case for all rms,
some of them receive large positive or negative productivity shocks that account for most of the changes
in productivity, but on average those shocks (and the associated reversion to the mean) roughly cancel out
across rms. The result is that reorganization can account for an increase in quantity-based productivity,
when rms reorganize, of about 7% while the average increase in productivity for these rms was about 6%.
Similarly, when rms reduce the number of layers, reorganization accounts for a 7% decrease in quantity-
based productivity while the average decrease in productivity for these rms was about 2%. Reorganization
amounts to more than 100% of the change in productivity! The results underscores the importance of the
reorganization of rms as a source of aggregate productivity gains in the economy.
6 Conclusion
Large rm expansions involve lumpy reorganizations that a¤ect rm productivity. Firms that reorganize
and add a layer increase hours of work by 25% and value added by slightly more than 3%, while rms that do
not reorganize decrease hours slightly and value added by only 0.1%. Reorganization therefore accompanies
rmsexpansions. A reorganization that adds layers allows the rm to operate at a larger scale. We have
24The unit of observation is a rm-product and we allow t  T and T to vary across rm-product pairs.
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shown that such a reorganization leads to increases in quantity-based productivity of about 4%. Even
though the productive e¢ ciency of the rm is enhanced by adding layers, its revenue-based productivity
declines by more than 4%. The new organizational structure lowers the marginal cost of the rm and it
allows it to increase its scale. This makes rms expand their quantity and move down their demand curves,
thereby lowering prices and revenue-based productivity.
We use a detailed data set of Portuguese rms to show that these facts are very robustly present in
the data. Our data set is somewhat special in that it not only includes employer-employee matched data,
necessary to built a rms hierarchy, but it also includes information on quantity produced. This allows us to
contrast the e¤ect of reorganization, using fairly exible methodologies, to calculate quantity and revenue-
based productivity. Furthermore, given that we have a relatively long panel, we show that the results hold
using a large number of rm-product-sequence xed e¤ects on top of time and industry dummies. We do not
nd any case in which the evidence signicantly falsies the main hypothesis of the e¤ect of a reorganization
on both types of rm productivity. In contrast, we present signicant evidence of a causal e¤ect of an
increase in layers on quantity-based productivity.
Our ndings underscore the role that organizational decisions play in determining rm productivity.
Our results, however, can be viewed more broadly as measuring the impact of lumpy rm level changes on
the endogenous component of rm productivity. Many changes that increase the capacity of the rm to
grow (like building a new plant or production line, or creating a new export link with a foreign partner) will
probably result in similar e¤ects on quantity and revenue-based productivity. In our view, the advantage
of looking at reorganizations using a rms management layers, as dened by occupational classications, is
that rms change them often and in a very systematic way. Furthermore, this high frequency implies that
many of the observed uctuations in both quantity-based and revenue-based productivity result from these
endogenous rm decisions and should not be treated as exogenous shocks to the rm.
Recognizing that part of a rms productivity changes are endogenous is relevant because the ability
of rms to change their organization might depend on the economic environment in which they operate.
We have shown that changing the number of management layers is important for rms to realize large
productivity gains when they grow. Environments in which building larger hierarchies is hard or costly
due, for example, to the inability to monitor managers or to enforce detailed labor contracts prevent rms
from obtaining these productivity gains.25 This, among other factors, could explain why rms in developing
countries tend to grow less rapidly (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014).
25See Bloom et al. (2013) for some evidence on potential impediments in India.
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Appendix A
We start with the matched employer-employee data set, keeping only rms in the manufacturing sector
located in mainland Portugal and dropping rms with non-positive sales. Information for the year 2001
for the matched employer-employee data set was only collected at the rm-level. Given that worker-level
variables are missing in 2001 we have to drop all rm-level observations for 2001. There are in total 353,311
rm-year observations. We then focus on the worker-level information and drop a minority of workers with
an invalid social security number and with multiple jobs in the same year. We further drop worker-year
pairs whenever (i) their monthly normal or overtime hours are non-positive or above 480; (ii) the sum of
weekly normal and overtime hours is below 25 and above 80; (iii) their age is below 16 and above 65 years;
(iv) they are not full-time employees of the rm. Based on the resulting sample, we trim worker-year pairs
whose monthly wage is outside a range dened by the corresponding year bottom and top 0.5 percentiles.
This leaves us with 321,719 rm-year and 5,174,324 worker-year observations. In the analysis, we focus
on manufacturing rms belonging to industries (NACE rev.1 2-digits between 15 and 37) excluding 16
"Manufacture of tobacco products", 23 "Manufacture of coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel",
30 "Manufacture of o¢ ce machinery and computers", and 37 "Recycling", due to condentiality reasons.
We then turn to the balance sheet data set and recover information on rmsoperating revenues, material
assets, costs of materials, and third-party supplies and services. We compute value-added as operating
revenues minus costs of materials and third-party supplies and services. We drop rm-year pairs with non-
positive value-added, material assets, cost of materials, and size. This reduces the size of the overall sample
to 61,872 rm-year observations and 2,849,363 worker-year observations.
Finally, we turn to the production data set and recover information on rm-product sales and volume for
each rm-product-year triple in the data set. In the production data set a product is identied by a 10-digits
code, plus an extra 2-digits that are used to dene di¤erent variants of the variable.26 The rst 8 digits
correspond to the European PRODCOM classication while the additional two have been added by INE to
further rene PRODCOM. The volume is recorded in units of measurement (number of items, kilograms,
litres) that are product-specic while the value is recorded in current euros. We drop observations where
the quantity produced, quantity sold, and sales are all zero. For each product-rm-year combination, we
are able to compute a unit value. We adjust the quantity sold, for each rm-year-product, by multiplying
it by the average (across rms) product-year unit value. We then construct a more aggregate partition of
products based on the rst 2-digits as well as on the unit of measurement. More specically, we assign
10-digits products sharing the same rst 2 digits and unit of measurement to the same aggregate product.
We keep only manufacturing products, and aggregate quantity sold and sales at the rm-year-product level
following the new denition of a product. We restrict the analysis to products with at least 50 rm-year
26From the raw data it is possible to construct di¤erent measures of the volume and value of a rmsproduction. For the
sake of this project we use the volume and value corresponding to a rmssales of its products. This means we exclude products
produced internally and to be used in other production processes within the rm as well as products produced for other rms,
using inputs provided by these other rms. The advantage of using this denition is that it nicely corresponds to the cost of
materials coming from the balance sheet data.
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observations. Finally, we merge the production data with the matched employer-employee and rm balance
sheet data.
Given that we restricted the set of products considered in the analysis, we compute the ratio between
total rm-year sales in the sample coming from the production data set and rm-year sales in the rm
balance sheet sample and drop rm-year pairs we extreme values of the ratio (below 25 percent and above
105 percent). We then adjust rm sales (from the balance sheet data), cost of materials, material assets,
wage bill, size, value-added, wage bill of layer zero, and number of employees in layer zero using the above
sales ratio. We then split the same set of variables into parts associated with each product, using the
product sales in the production data set. We trim rm-year-product triples that do not satisfy one or more
of the following constraints: the sum of cost of materials and wages, as a share of sales, below one; unit
value between the 1st and 99th percentiles; cost of materials as a share of sales between the 1st and 99th
percentiles; ratio of material assets to size between the 1st and 99th percentiles. The size of the sample is
now 19,031 rm-year observations and 1,593,294 worker-year observations.
Table A.1: Classication of Workers According to Hierarchical Levels
      
Level Tasks Skills 
1. Top executives (top management) Definition of the firm general policy or consulting 
on the organization of the firm; strategic planning; 
creation or adaptation of technical, scientific and 
administrative methods or processes 
Knowledge of management and coordination of firms 
fundamental activities; knowledge of management and 
coordination of the fundamental activities in the field to 
which the individual is assigned and that requires the 
study and research of high responsibility and technical 
level problems 
2. Intermediary executives (middle 
management) 
Organization and adaptation of the guidelines 
established by the superiors and directly linked 
with the executive work 
Technical and professional qualifications directed to 
executive, research, and management work 
3. Supervisors, team leaders Orientation of teams, as directed by the superiors, 
but requiring the knowledge of action processes 
Complete professional qualification with a specialization 
4. Higher-skilled professionals Tasks requiring a high technical value and defined 
in general terms by the superiors 
Complete professional qualification with a specialization 
adding to theoretical and applied knowledge 
5. Skilled professionals Complex or delicate tasks, usually not repetitive, 
and defined by the superiors 
Complete professional qualification implying theoretical 
and applied knowledge 
6. Semi-skilled professionals Well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical 
(no intellectual work) with low complexity, usually 
routine and sometimes repetitive 
Professional qualification in a limited field or practical and 
elementary professional knowledge 
7. Non-skilled professionals Simple tasks and totally determined Practical knowledge and easily acquired 
in a short time 
8. Apprentices, interns, trainees Apprenticeship   
Notes: Hierarchical levels defined according to Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd (Lima and Pereira, 2003). 
 
All monetary values are deated to 2005 euros using the monthly (aggregated to annual) Consumer Price
Index (CPI - Base 2008) by Special Aggregates from Statistics Portugal. Monthly wages are converted to
annual by multiplying by 14.
Some concepts are recurring in the explanation of a majority of the tables and gures. We dene them
here and consider them understood main text:
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 Layer number. In the matched employer-employee data set, each worker, in each year, has to be
assigned to a category following a (compulsory) classication of workers dened by the Portuguese law
(see Table A.1 and Mion and Opromolla, 2014). Classication is based on the tasks performed and
skill requirements, and each category can be considered as a level in a hierarchy dened in terms of
increasing responsibility and task complexity. On the basis of the hierarchical classication and taking
into consideration the actual wage distribution, we partition the available categories into occupations.
We assign "Top executives (top management)" to occupation 3; "Intermediary executives (middle
management)" and "Supervisors, team leaders" to occupation 2; "Higher-skilled professionals" and
some "Skilled professionals" to occupation 1; and the remaining employees, including "Skilled profes-
sionals", "Semi-skilled professionals", "Non-skilled professionals", and "Apprenticeship" to occupation
0. The position of the workers in the hierarchy of the rm, starting from 0 (lowest layer, present in
all rms) to 3 (highest layer, only present in rms with 3 layers of management).
 Number of layers of management. A rm reporting c occupational categories will be said to have
L = c   1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will have rms spanning from 0 to 3 layers
of management (as in CMRH). In terms of layers within a rm we do not keep track of the specic
occupational categories but simply rank them. Hence a rm with occupational categories 2 and 0 will
have 1 layer of management, and its organization will consist of a layer 0 corresponding to some skilled
and non-skilled professionals, and a layer 1 corresponding to intermediary executives and supervisors.
 Reorganization in year t. A rm reorganizes in year t when it changes the number of management
layers with respect to those observed in the most recent prior available year (year t  1 in most cases).
 Year of the rst observed reorganization for a rm. The earliest reorganization year observed
(for those rms rst appearing in the data prior to 1997) or the rst year in which a rm appears in
the data (for those rms rst appearing in the data in 1997 or later).
 Firm industry. The industry of the rm is measured according to the NACE rev.1 2-digits disag-
gregation. This includes 19 divisions, from division 15 (Manufacture of food products and beverages)
to division 36 (Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.). We drop division 16 (Manufacture
of tobacco products), 23 (Manufacture of coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel), and 30
(Manufacture of o¢ ce machinery and computers) because they comprise very few observations.
 Wage bill. A worker annual wage is computed adding the monthly base and overtime wages plus
regular benets and multiplying by 14. We apply a trimming of the top and bottom 0:5 per cent
within each year. A rm wage bill is the sum of the annual wages of all its workers that satisfy the
criteria listed above.
 Value added. Value added is computed, from the balance sheet data set, as operating revenues minus
costs of materials and third-party supplies and services.
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 Revenue productivity. The log of the ratio between rm sales and employment.
 Value added productivity. The log of the ratio between rm value added and employment.
 OLS TFP. Log total factor productivity computed from a standard three factors (labour, capital and
materials) Cobb-Douglas production function model where output is measured by rm sales and the
model is estimated via OLS. Separate estimations have been carried for each industry.
 Olley and Pakes revenue-based TFP. Log total factor productivity computed from a standard
two factors (labour and capital) Cobb-Douglas production function model where output is measured
by rm value-added. Productivity shocks are modeled as in Olley and Pakes (1996) while being further
enriched with layers along the lines presented in Section 5.1. We use the lagged number of management
layers to instrument Lit in the second stage of the OP procedure. Separate estimations have been
carried for each industry.
 Wooldridge revenue-based productivity. Log total factor productivity computed from a standard
two factors (labour and capital) Cobb-Douglas production function model where output is measured
by rm value-added. Productivity shocks are modeled as in Wooldridge (2009) while being further
enriched with layers as described in Section 5.1. Separate estimations have been carried for each
industry.
 Price. In the PC data set a product is identied by a 10-digits code. The rst 8 digits correspond to
the European PRODCOM classication while the additional two have been added by INE to further
rene PRODCOM. The volume is recorded in units of measurement (number of items, kilograms,
litres) that are product-specic while the value is recorded in current euros. Therefore, for each
product-rm-year combination, we are able to compute a price.
 Quantity-based TFP. We run separate quantity-based productivity estimations for each of the
aggregate products using variations of the MULAMA methodology. See the next appendix for a
detailed explanation of the estimation methodologies.
Table Descriptions
Table 1: This table reports, for each year, the number of rms in Sample 1 and corresponding averages
across all rms for selected variables. Value added, hours, and wage are dened above. Value added is in
2005 euros. Wage is average hourly wage in 2005 euros. Hours are yearly. # of layers is the average number
of layers of management across rms in each year.
Table 2: Table 2 reports summary statistics on rm-level outcomes, grouping rm-year observations
according to the number of layers of management reported (# of layers). Firm-years is the number of
rm-years observations in the data with the given number of layers of management. Value added, hours,
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and wage are dened above. Value added in 000s of 2005 euros. Wage is either average or median hourly
wage in 2005 euros. Both value added and wages are detrended. Hours are yearly.
Table 3 and 4: Table 3 reports the fraction of rms that satisfy a hierarchy in hours, grouping rms
by their number of layers of management (# number of layers). Hours N lL is the number of hours reported
in layer l in an L layers of management rm. For L = 1; 2; 3, and l = 0; :::; L  1 we say that a rm satises
a hierarchy in hours between layers number l and l + 1 in a given year if N lL  N l+1L , i.e. if the number of
hours worked in layer l is at least as large as the number of hours worked in layer l + 1; moreover, we say
that a rm satises a hierarchy at all layers if N lL  N l+1L 8l = 0; :::; L   1, i.e. if the number of hours
worked in layer l is at least as large as the number of hours in layer l+1, for all layers in the rm. Following
these denitions, the top panel reports, among all rms with L = 1; 2; 3 layers of management, the fraction
of those that satisfy a hierarchy in hours at all layers (rst column), and the fraction of those that satisfy a
hierarchy in hours between layer l and l + 1, with l = 0; :::; L  1 (second to fourth column).
Table 4 is the same as Table 3 for the case of wages, where wlL is the average hourly wage in layer l in
an L layers of management rm.
Table 5: Table 5 reports the distribution of the number of layers of management at time t+1, grouping
rms according to the number of layers of management at time t. Among all rms with L layers of
management (L = 0; :::; 3) in any year from 1996 to 2004, the columns report the fraction of rms that
have layers 0; :::; 3 the following year (from 1997 to 2005), or are not present in the dataset, Exit. The table
also reports, in the bottom row, the distribution of the new rms by their initial number of layers. The
elements in the table sum to 100% by row.
Table 6: This table shows changes in rm-level outcomes between adjacent years for all rms (All), and
for the subsets of those that increase (Increase L), dont change (No change in L) and decrease (Decrease
L) layers. It reports changes in log hours, log normalized hours, log value added, log average wage, and
log average wage in common layers for the whole sample. The change in average wage for common layers
in a rm that transitions from L to L0 layers is the change in the average wage computed using only the
min fL;L0g layers before and after the transition. To detrend a variable, we subtract from all the log changes
in a given year the average change during the year across all rms.
Table 7: This table reports the results of regressions of log change in normalized hours by layer on
log change in value added for rms that do not change their number of layers of management L across two
adjacent periods. Specically, we run a regression of log change in normalized hours at layer l (layer) in a
rm with L (# of layers in the rm) layers of management on a constant and log change in value added
across all the rms that stay at L layers of management across two adjacent years. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
Table 8: This table reports the results of regressions of log change in hourly wage by layer on log change
in value added for rms that do not change their number of layers of management L across two adjacent
periods. Specically, we run a regression of log change in average hourly wage at layer l (layer) in a rm
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with L (# of layers in the rm) layers of management on a constant and log change in value added across
all the rms that stay at L layers of management across two adjacent years. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
Table 9: This table shows estimates of the average log change in normalized hours at each layer l
(Layer) among rms that transition from L (# of layers before) to L0 layers (# of layers after), with L 6= L0:
for a transition from L to L0, we can only evaluate changes for layer number l = 0; :::;min fL;L0g. d lnnlLit
is the average log change in the transition, estimated as a regression of the log change in the number of
normalized hours in layer l in two adjacent years on a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 10: This table shows estimates of the average log change in hourly wage at each layer l (Layer)
among rms that transition from L (# of layers before) to L0 layers (# of layers after), with L 6= L0: for a
transition from L to L0, we can only evaluate changes for layer number l = 0; :::;min fL;L0g. d lnwlLit is the
average log change in the transition, estimated as a regression of the log change in the average hourly wage
in layer l in two adjacent years on a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 11: The data underlying Table 11 is composed of sequences of rm-product-years with either
one or zero changes in layers. For a given product, we dene a rm sequence of type L   L0 as the series
of years in which a rm sells the corresponding product and has the same consecutively observed number
of management layers L plus the adjacent series of years in which a rm sells the product and has the
same consecutively observed number of management layers L0. For example, a rm that we observed selling
the product all years between 1996 and 2000 and that has zero layers in 1996, 1997, and 2000 and one
layer in 1998 and 1999 would have two sequences: An (increasing) 0-1 sequence (1996 to 1999) as well as
a (decreasing) 1-0 sequence (1998 to 2000). Firms that never change layers in our sample form a constant-
layer sequence. We group rm-product sequences into Increasing, Decreasing, and Constantsequence
types.
For each type of sequence, Table 11 shows estimates of regressions where the dependent variable is (log)
revenue labor productivity in a given year. The key regressor is the number of management layers in the
rm in the same year. We control for the (log) revenue labor productivity in the previous year, and include
rm-product-sequence xed e¤ects. We also include a set of year dummies. Firm-level clustered standard
errors are in parentheses. The last column of Table 11 shows estimates of a regression that pools all types
of sequences.
Table 12: The data underlying Table 12 is at the rm-product-year level. We groups rms according to
the number of layers (0; 1; 2 or 3) the rm has in the year of the rst observed reorganization (see denition
above). For each of these groups of rm-product-years Table 12 shows estimates of regressions where the
dependent variable is (log) revenue labor productivity in a given year. The key regressor is the number of
management layers in the rm in the same year. We control for the (log) revenue labor productivity in the
previous year, and include rm-product xed e¤ects. We also include a set of year dummies. Firm-level
clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 13 and 14: Tables 13 and 14 show estimates of the same type of regressions described for Table
11 and 12. The only di¤erence being that the dependent variable is (log) revenue total factor productivity
computed according to the Wooldridge methodology.
Table 15 to 22, and C1 and C2 : This set of tables show estimates of the same type of regressions
described for Table 11 and 12.
In Table 15 and 16 the dependent variable is (log) quantity-based productivity computed according to
the MULAMA methodology extended for incorporating changes in the organization of the labor input as
described in Case 1 of Section 5.2.2. In this case the key regressor is the quantity sold by the rm in t,
which is allowed to have permanent e¤ects on the rm productivity.
In Table 17 and 18 the dependent variable is (log) quantity-based productivity computed according to
the MULAMA methodology extended for incorporating changes in the organization of the labor input as
described in Case 2 of Section 5.2.2. In this case the key regressor is the number of management layers of
the rm in t, which is allowed to have permanent e¤ects on the rm productivity.
In Table 19 and 20 the dependent variable is (log) revenue-based productivity computed according to
the Wooldridge methodology extended for incorporating changes in the organization of the labor input as
described in Case 2 of Section 5.2.2. In this case the key regressor is the number of management layers of
the rm in t, which is allowed to have only a contemporaneous e¤ect on the rm productivity.
In Table 21 and 22 the dependent variable is (log) quantity-based productivity computed according to
the MULAMA methodology extended for incorporating changes in the organization of the labor input as
described in Case 2 of Section 5.2.2. In this case the key regressor is the number of management layers of
the rm in t, which is allowed to have only a contemporaneous e¤ect on the rm productivity.
In Table C1 and C2 the dependent variable is (log) quantity-based productivity computed according to
the MULAMA methodology extended for incorporating changes in the organization of the labor input as
described in Case 1 of Appendix C. In this case the key regressor is the quantity sold by the rm in t, which
is allowed to have only a contemporaneous e¤ect on the rm productivity.
Table 23 to 26, and C3 and C4: This set of tables show estimates of the same type of regressions
described for Table 19 to 22, but we instrument for the change in quantity or for the change in the number
of layers using the number of layers in t  1, quantity, revenue, demand shocks and markups at time t  1,
capital at time t, and productivity at time t 2. Also, we replace the rm-product or rm-product-sequence
xed e¤ects with a set of product dummies and year dummies.
Figure 5, 6, and 7: These gures report kernel density estimates of the distribution of log value added
(Figure 5), log hours worked (Figure 6) and log hourly wage (Figure 7) by number of layers in the rm.
One density is estimated for each group of rms with the same number of layers.
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Appendix B
Baseline MULAMA
In this appendix we show how to derive the rst stage estimating equation (11), for the baseline MU-
LAMA
Demand in log is given by
pit =

1  1
it

it   1
it
qit; (16)
the markup then is
it =
it
it   1
: (17)
The production function in log is
qit = ait + Ooit + Mmit + (   M   O)kit; (18)
and the assumptions over Markov process for productivity and demand are given by
ait = a ait 1 + ait; (19)
it = it 1 + it: (20)
From cost minimization one obtains that the marginal cost is given by
@Ci
@Qi
=
1
O + M
Ci
Qi
(21)
Using (16) and (17), revenue can be expressed in the following way
rit =
1
it
(qit + it) : (22)
Using (21) note that expenditure shares are related to markups in the following way
1
it
=
sOit
O
=
sMit
L
: (23)
First stage
In order to derive the estimating equation start from (18) and (19) to obtain
qit = O (oit   kit) + M (mit   kit) + kit + a ait 1 + ait; (24)
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then substituting this expression into (22)
rit =
O
it
(oit   kit) + M
it
(mit   kit) + 
it
kit +
a
it
ait 1 +
1
it
ait +
1
it
it;
rearranging and using (23) we dene as in the main body of the text
LHSit =
rit   sOit (oit   kit)  sMit (mit   kit)
sMit
; (25)
or written di¤erently
LHSit =

M
kit +
a
M
ait 1 +
1
M
it +
1
M
ait:
We need to nd expressions for ait 2 and it 1:
From (22) note that
it 1 = it 1rit 1   qit 1; (26)
then using this expression into (20) we obtain
it = 
 
it 1rit 1   qit 1

+ it: (27)
Now from (25) we can obtain
ait 2 =
M
a
LHSit 1   
a
kit 1   1
a
it 1   1
a
ait 1;
using (26) we get
ait 2 =
M
a
LHSit 1   
a
kit 1   1
a
 
it 1rit 1   qit 1
  1
a
ait 1;
and after substituting this expression in (19) ;
ait 1 = MLHSit 1   kit 1  
 
it 1rit 1   qit 1

: (28)
Using (28) and (27) into (25) we obtain,
LHSit =

M
kit + aLHSit 1   
a
M
kit 1
+ (   a)
rit 1
sMit 1
+ (a   )
1
M
qit 1
+
1
M
(ait + it) :
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More compactly, we end up with (11)
LHSit = b1z1it + b2z2it + b3z3it + b4z4it + b5z5it + uit:
Second stage
Using (23) rm log output qit can be written as
qit = itsOit (oit   kit) + itsMit (mit   kit) + kit + ait:
Further exploiting (19) and (28), as well as b^1 =

M
= sMitit
and b^2 = a, we get
qit = 
oit   kit
b^1
sOit
sMit
+ 
mit   kit
b^1
+ kit + 
b^2
b^1
LHSit 1   b^2kit 1    rit 1b^2
b^1sMit 1
+ b^2qit 1 + ait
and so
qit   b^2qit 1 = b6z6it + ait
where
z6it =
oit   kit
b^1
sOit
sMit
+
mit   kit
b^1
+ kit +
b^2
b^1
LHSit 1   b^2kit 1   rit 1b^2
b^1sMit 1
;
and b6 = .
Derivations for Case 1
In this case, the production function is given by
qit = ~ait + O lnn
0
iL;t + Mmit + (   M   O)kit; (29)
and the Markov process for productivity and demand shocks
~ait = a ~ait 1 + q qit + ait; (30)
it = it 1 + it; (31)
where ait and it can be correlated with each other.
At any given point in time rms minimize costs for exible inputs (number of layer zero workers n0iL;t
and materials Mit) considering capital, as well as ~ait 1, ait, it and the price of materials and knowledge
as given. Short-run marginal cost thus satises
@Cit
@Qit
=
1  q
O + M
Cit
Qit
: (32)
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Using (16) and (17), log revenue can be expressed in the following way:
rit =
1
it
(qit + it) (33)
Using (32) note that expenditure shares are related to markups
1
it
 
1  q
 = sMit
M
=
sOit
O
; (34)
where sOit here represents the share of layer zero workers expenditure in total revenue.
Using (29) and (30) one obtains:
qit =
O
1  q
 
lnn0iL;t   kit

+
M
1  q
(mit   kit) + 
1  q
kit +
a
1  q
~ait 1 +
1
1  q
ait; (35)
then substituting this expression into (33)
rit =
O 
1  q

it
 
lnn0iL;t   kit

+
M 
1  q

it
(mit   kit)
+
 
1  q

it
kit +
a 
1  q

it
~ait 1 +
1 
1  q

it
ait +
1
it
it:
First stage
Rearranging and using (34) we dene LHSit and get:
LHSit 
rit   sOit

lnn0iL;t   kit

  sMit (mit   kit)
sMit
(36)
=

M
kit +
a
M
~ait 1 +
1  q
M
it +
1
M
ait:
We need to nd expressions for ~ait 2 and it 1: From (33) note that:
it 1 = it 1rit 1   qit 1; (37)
then using this expression into (31) we obtain:
it = 
 
it 1rit 1   qit 1

+ it: (38)
Now from (36) we can obtain
~ait 2 =
M
a
LHSit 1   
a
kit 1  
1  q
a
it 1   1
a
ait 1;
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while using (37) we get
~ait 2 =
M
a
LHSit 1   
a
kit 1  
1  q
a
 
it 1rit 1   qit 1
  1
a
ait 1;
and after substituting this expression in (30)
~ait 1 = MLHSit 1   kit 1  
 
1  q
  
it 1rit 1   qit 1

+ q qit 1: (39)
Using (39) and (38) into (36) we obtain
LHSit =

M
kit + aLHSit 1   
a
M
kit 1 (40)
+ (   a)
rit 1
sMit 1
+
 
a    + q
 1
M
qit 1
+
1
M
 
ait +
 
1  q

it

;
that we can rewrite as:
LHSit = b1z1it + b2z2it + b3z3it + b4z4it + b5z5it + uit; (41)
where z1it=kit, z2it=LHSit 1, z3it=kit 1, z4it=
rit 1
sMit 1 , z5it=qit 1, uit=
1
M
 
ait +
 
1  q

it

as well
as b1=

M
, b2=a, b3=  aM , b4=(   a) and b5= 1M
 
a    + q

. Given our assumptions the error
term uit in is uncorrelated with all of the regressors. Therefore (41) can be estimated via simple OLS. After
doing this we set ^=b^1 and ^a=b^2 and do not exploit parametersconstraints in the estimation.
Second stage
From (35) and (39) we have that log output is given by:
qit =
O
1  q
 
lnn0iL;t   kit

+
M
1  q
(mit   kit) + 
1  q
kit
+
a
1  q
MLHSit 1   a
1  q
kit 1   a
1  q

M
sMit 1
rit 1   qit 1

+
1
1  q
ait:
Substituting (34) and known parameters from the rst stage, we obtain
qit =

1  q
1
^
sOit
sMit
 
lnn0iL;t   kit

+

1  q
1
^
(mit   kit) + 
1  q
kit
+

1  q
^a
^
LHSit 1   
1  q
^akit 1  

1  q
1
^
^a
sMit 1
rit 1 +
^a
1  q
qit 1 +
1
1  q
ait:
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Note that the only parameters to estimate are  and q: These are identied using a linear model:
qit = b6z6it + b7z7it + "it; (42)
where:
z6it =
1
^
sOit
sMit
 
lnn0iL;t   kit

+
1
^
(mit   kit) + kit + ^a
^
LHSit 1   ^akit 1  
1
^
^a
sMit 1
rit 1;
z7it = ^aqit 1;
"it =
1
1  q
ait;
as well as b6 =

1 q and b7 =
1
1 q . Note that z6it is endogenous and we instrument it with kit. We then
set ^ = b^6=b^7 and ^q =
b^7 1
b^7
and obtain:
a^it = qit   ^
^
sOit
sMit
 
lnn0it   kit
  ^
^
(mit   kit)  ^kit
^it =
^
^sMit(1  ^q)
^it =
^
^sMit(1  ^q)
rit   qit:
Derivations for Case 2
In this case, the production function in logs can be written as
qit = ~ait + O lnWBit + Mmit + (   M   O)kit; (43)
where WBit is the wage bill at time t of rm i:
The Markov process for productivity and demand shocks are
~ait = a ~ait 1 + LLit + ait; (44)
it = it 1 + it; (45)
where ait and it can be correlated with each other.
Following the same steps as we did for Case 1, the short-run marginal cost satises
@Cit
@Qit
=
1
O + M
Cit
Qit
: (46)
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Using (16) and (17), log revenue can be expressed in the following way:
rit =
1
it
(qit + it) : (47)
Using (21) note that expenditure shares are related to markups in the following way
1
it
=
sMit
M
=
sOit
O
: (48)
where sOit here represents the share of total labor expenditure in total revenue.
Using (43) and (44) one obtains:
qit = O (lnWBit   kit) + M (mit   kit) + kit + a~ait 1 + LLit + ait; (49)
then substituting this expression into (47):
rit =
O
it
(lnWBit   kit) + M
it
(mit   kit)
+

it
kit +
a
it
~ait 1 +
L
it
Lit +
1
it
ait +
1
it
it:
First stage
Rearranging and using (48) we dene LHSit and get:
LHSit  rit   sOit (lnWBit   kit)  sMit (mit   kit)
sMit
(50)
=

M
kit +
a
M
~ait 1 +
1
M
it +
L
M
Lit +
1
M
ait:
We need to nd expressions for ~ait 2 and it 1: From (22) note that:
it 1 = it 1rit 1   qit 1; (51)
then using this expression into (45) we obtain:
it = 
 
it 1rit 1   qit 1

+ it: (52)
Now from (50) we can obtain:
~ait 2 =
M
a
LHSit 1   
a
kit 1   1
a
it 1   L
a
Lit 1   1
a
ait 1;
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while using (51) we get:
~ait 2 =
M
a
LHSit 1   
a
kit 1   1
a
 
it 1rit 1   qit 1
  L
a
Lit 1   1
a
ait 1;
and after substituting this expression in (44)
~ait 1 = MLHSit 1   kit 1  
 
it 1rit 1   qit 1

: (53)
Using (53) and (52) into (50) we obtain:
LHSit =

M
kit + aLHSit 1   
a
M
kit 1 (54)
+ (   a)
rit 1
sMit 1
+ (a   )
1
M
qit 1
+
L
M
Lit +
1
M
(ait + it) ;
that we can rewrite as
LHSit = b1z1it + b2z2it + b3z3it + b4z4it + b5z5it + b6z6it + uit; (55)
where z1it=kit, z2it=LHSit 1, z3it=kit 1, z4it=
rit 1
sMit 1 , z5it=qit 1, z6it=Lit, uit=
1
M
(ait + it) as well as
b1=

M
, b2=a, b3=  aM , b4=(   a), b5= 1M (a   ) and b6=
L
M
. Given our assumptions the error
term uit in is uncorrelated with all of the regressors but z6it=Lit. Coherently with our assumptions we
instrument Lit with Lit 1. After doing this we set ^=b^1 and ^a=b^2 and do not exploit parametersconstraints
in the estimation.
Second stage
From (49) and (53) we have that log output is given by
qit = O (lnWBit   kit) + M (mit   kit) + kit
+aMLHSit 1   akit 1   a

M
sMit 1
rit 1   qit 1

+ LLit + ait:
Substituting (48) and known parameters from the rst stage, we obtain
qit = 
1
^
sOit
sMit
(lnWBit   kit) +  1
^
(mit   kit) + kit
+
^a
^
LHSit 1   ^akit 1   
1
^
^a
sMit 1
rit 1 + ^aqit 1 + LLit + ait:
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Note that the only parameters to estimate are  and L: These are identied using a linear model:
qit   ^aqit 1 = b7z7it + b8z8it + "it; (56)
where:
z7it =
1
^
sOit
sMit
(lnWBit   kit) + 1
^
(mit   kit) + kit + ^a
^
LHSit 1   ^akit 1  
1
^
^a
sMit 1
rit 1;
z8it = Lit;
"it = ait;
as well as b7 =  and b8 = L. Note that z7it and z8it are endogenous and we instrument them with kit and
Lit 1. We then set ^ = b^7 and obtain
a^it = qit   ^
^
sOit
sMit
(lnWBit   kit)  ^
^
(mit   kit)  ^kit
^it =
^
^sMit
^it =
^
^sMit
rit   qit:
7 Appendix C
In this Appendix we present the results for Case 1 without and with IV when we allow only for contempo-
raneous e¤ects quantity-based productivity.
The process for quantity-based productivity in equation (12), when we only consider contemporaneous
e¤ects, becomes
~ait = a ~ait 1 + qit + ait: (57)
We use the process in (57) and recompute all the shocks in the model using the MULAMA methodology.
The results are presented in Table C.1 and C.2. The results in Table C.1 are consistent with our hypothesis
and all highly signicant. The e¤ect of quantity on productivity is positive and signicant for rms that
either increase or drop layers, and it is larger for these rms than for rms that do not change layers. Note
also that the e¤ects are much smaller than in Table 15 which indicates that the average level e¤ect over
time might be larger than the immediate contemporaneous e¤ects.
Table C.2 presents the results ordered by layer. The results for rms that start with 1, 2 or 3 layers are
all positive and signicant, although the estimate for rms with zero layers is negative and not signicant.
Table C.3 presents the results for the specication of the process of quantity-based productivity in
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Table C.1: MULAMA Quantity TFP Case 1 Cont. Firm-product-sequence FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.141c 0.061 0.248b 0.149a
(0 .086) (0 .050) (0 .111) (0 .054)
Change in quantity 0.233a 0.205a 0.166a 0.194a
(0 .081) (0 .065) (0 .058) (0 .041)
Constant 0.074c 0.167a 0.049 -0.048
(0 .041) (0 .061) (0 .034) (0 .052)
Observations 4,171 2,840 3,055 10,066
Number of xed e¤ects 1,673 1,280 1,298 4,251
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.023 0.069 0.035
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table C.2: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 1 Contemporaneous. Firm-product FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 -0.179 0.201 0.370a 0.231a
(0 .146) (0 .133) (0 .060) (0 .048)
Change in quantity -0.245 0.182b 0.332a 0.167a
(0 .237) (0 .084) (0 .078) (0 .048)
Constant 0.818a 0.251a 0.014 -0.026
(0 .205) (0 .061) (0 .029) (0 .036)
Observations 532 1,649 3,674 3,523
Number of xed e¤ects 163 549 1,149 1,148
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.067 0.141 0.073
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
equation (57), but when we instrument for the change in quantity using the variables described in the
main text. As we can see, for a rm that adds layers, a 10% increase in quantity leads to a 2.5% increase
in productivity. The results are much weaker (and not signicant) for rms that drop layers. They are
also positive and signicant for rms with constant numbers of layers, which indicates that quantity and
quantity-based productivity are probably related through other channels, as we had found before. Still,
for the signicant estimates, we nd that changes in organization lead to a larger change in real-based
productivity than when we do not observe a reorganization. The persistence coe¢ cient in this case is
around .9. As before, the reason is that we have dropped the set of rm-product-sequence xed e¤ects.
Table C.4 presents the results when we group by initial layer. All the estimates of the e¤ects of changes
in quantity are positive, although as in previous cases, not signicant for rms that start with either zero
57
Table C.3: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 1 Contemporaneous with IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Productivity t-1 0.872a 0.856a 0.920a 0.884a
(0 .024) (0 .024) (0 .026) (0 .016)
Change in quantity 0.246b 0.095 0.148b 0.170a
(0 .100) (0 .138) (0 .073) (0 .062)
Observations 3,748 2,181 2,098 8,027
Adjusted R2 0.720 0.715 0.800 0.750
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table C.4: MULAMA Quantity TFP: Case 1 Contemporaneous with IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers
Productivity t-1 0.802a 0.866a 0.866a 0.883a
(0 .074) (0 .040) (0 .020) (0 .031)
Change in quantity 0.317 0.085 0.331a 0.161a
(0 .372) (0 .150) (0 .105) (0 .061)
Observations 532 1,649 3,674 3,523
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.677 0.737 0.746
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
or one layer.
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